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DOES THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
PROTECT YOUR RIGHT TO PRIVACY?




Congressional, executive, and public support for privacy legisla-
tion coalesced in the Privacy Act of 1974.' Before passage of the
Privacy Act, Congress struggled with many of the problems raised
by increased government collection and use of personal informa-
tion.2 Congressional findings accompanying the Privacy Act reveal
1. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1988)); see Ehlke, The Privacy Act After a Decade, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 829, 835-40 (1985)
(examining amendments to Privacy Act).
2. See, e.g., Privacy: The Collection, Use and Computerization of Personal Data: Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Information Systems of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations
and the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974) (reporting hearings on threat to personal privacy posed by computerized informa-
tional systems maintained by federal government); Right to Privacy of Federal Employees: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Retirement and Employee Benefits of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil
Service, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (reporting hearings on federal agency actions affecting
privacy of federal employees); Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) [hereinafter Hearings on Federal Data Banks] (reporting hearings on nature and scope of
personal information held by federal agencies); see also Hanus & Relyea, A Policy Assessment of
the Privacy Act of 1974, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 555, 565-69 (1976) (surveying congressional hearings
on informational privacy issues as well as other congressional activity preceding passage of
Privacy Act); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESs., FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS iv-v
(Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTrrUTIONAL RIGirrs] (review-
ing comprehensive survey of enormous number of federal data banks, and recommending
establishment of privacy safeguards, provision for notice and review to citizens in data bank,
continued legislative oversight, and constraint on interagency transfers of personal informa-
tion); id. at xv-xxxii (reviewing legislative privacy initiatives from 1965-1972).
The amount of personal information held by the federal government is staggering. See, e.g.,
Records Maintained by Government Agencies: Hearings on H.R. 9527 and Related Bills Before a Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1972) [hereinafter
Records Maintained by Government Agencies] (statement of Rep. Edward Pattern) (noting average
American is subject of estimated 10-20 files compiled by government on private organiza-
tions); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., 1ST SESs., GOVERNMENT DOSSIER 1 (Comm. Print
1967) (examining 1966 survey on personal information held by government agencies and
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Congress' recognition of the need to safeguard individual privacy in
personal information. 3 President Gerald Ford, a strong advocate of
individual privacy, voiced executive branch support for the Privacy
Act.4 Additional support was forthcoming from the public which, in
the wake of technological advances, evinced increased apprehension
over government invasion of individual privacy.5
finding more than 3 billion records on individuals, including 27.2 billion names, 2.3 billion
addresses, 264 million criminal histories, 280 million mental health records, 916 million
profiles on alcoholism and drug addiction, and 1.2 billion financial records); see also The Com-
puter and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before the Spedal Subcomm. on Invasion of Pivacy of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1966) (statement of Vance Pack-
ard) (describing dangers of proposed federal data bank center and expressing concern that
use of information as form of control by government increases greatly as centralization of
information grows).
3. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (Congressional Findings and Statement
of Purpose). Congress found that:
(1) the privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection, maintenance,
use, and dissemination of personal information by Federal agencies;
(2) the increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technology,
while essential to the efficient operations of the Government, has greatly magnified
the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use,
or dissemination of personal information;
(3) the opportunities for an individual to secure employment, insurance, and
credit, and his right to due process, and other legal protections are endangered by
the misuse of certain information systems;
(4) the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Con-
stitution of the United States; and
(5) in order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems
maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary and proper for the Congress to regu-
late the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by such
agencies.
Id.
4. See President's Remarks at Dedication of Stanford School of Law, 11 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1044, 1046 (Sept. 21, 1975) (discussing government invasion of personal privacy
and need for Privacy Act). President Ford's commitment to the right to privacy stems, in part,
from his participation in the Domestic Council Committee on the Right of Privacy (Privacy
Committee) to which he was appointed chairman by President Richard Nixon. President's
Address on Nationwide Radio on the American Right of Privacy, 10 WEEKLY COMI'. PRES.
Doc. 245, 246 (Feb. 23, 1974). President Nixon requested the Privacy Committee to examine
the collection, maintenance, and use of personal information and safeguards of such informa-
tion against improper disclosure. Id. at 246-47. Prophetically, President Nixon commented
in his address that "[a]dvanced technology has created new opportunities for America as a
Nation, but it has also created the possibility for new abuses of the individual." Id. A year
later, President Ford noted that Congress had incorporated many of the Privacy Committee's
recommendations. President's Remarks at Dedication of Stanford School of Law, 11 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1044, 1046 (Sept. 21, 1975).
5. See L. HARRIS, THE ROAD AFrER 1984: A NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ITS
LEADERS ON THE NEW TECHNOLOGY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR AMERICAN LIFE (1983) (exam-
ining perceived effect of new technology on public). According to the 1983 survey, 48% of
the public voiced strong concern about threats to personal privacy, a two-fold increase from
1978. Id. at 22. In addition, 60% of the public believed their personal privacy required limi-
tations on the use of computers. Id. at 23. Finally, a majority of the public considered their
personal privacy likely to be seriously invaded by the transfer of personal inFormation among
government agencies. Id. at 25; see also FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
supra note 2, at ix-xiv (noting public reaction to invasion of personal privacy by technology).
See generally L. HARRIS & A. WESTIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY (1981) (examining public
concern over personal privacy).
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President Ford acclaimed the Privacy Act as an important first
step toward safeguarding individual privacy.6 Further, both Con-
gress and the public voiced their support for the Privacy Act. 7 The
principal purpose of the Privacy Act, the protection of individual
privacy, was praiseworthy. Whether the Privacy Act would actually
achieve its goal, however, had yet to be determined.
The centerpiece of the Privacy Act, the prohibition on nonconsen-
sual disclosure of personal information,8 is subject to numerous ex-
emptions. 9 One of these, the routine use exemption, permits
nonconsensual disclosure of personal information where the pur-
pose for collection is compatible with its use by the federal agency. 10
The routine use exemption has threatened to emasculate the Privacy
Act's protection of individual privacy." Neither the federal agen-
cies nor the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has actively
overseen the exemption's use.' 2 Nor has Congress deterred contin-
ued abuse of the exemption.' 3 Finally, statutory and procedural
barriers have prevented the courts from averting abuse of the ex-
emption through judicial action. 14
6. President's Statement Upon Signing the Bill (Privacy Act) Into Law, 11 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 7, 7 (Jan. 1, 1975). The President recognized the Privacy Act as "an initial
advance in protecting a right precious to every American-the right of individual privacy." Id.
While approving of the Privacy Act as an important beginning, the President recognized that
the Privacy Act did not "adequately protect the individual against unnecessary disclosures of
personal information." Id. at 7-8.
7. See Berman & Goldman, A Federal Right of Information Privacy: The Need for Reform, 4
BENTON FOUNDATION PROJECT ON COMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION POLICY OPTIONS 1-3
(1989) (noting strong congressional and public support for Privacy Act).
8. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 1416, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1974) [hereinafter H.R. RP. No. 1416] (considering prohibition on non-consen-
sual disclosure perhaps most important provision of bill), reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMM.
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY
ACT OF 1974: SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY 305 (Joint Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SOURCE
BOOK ON PRIVACY].
9. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)-(12) (1988); see infra notes 49-60 and ac-
companying text (providing statutory language of exemptions).
10. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1988); see infra note 61 (providing statu-
tory language of routine use exemption); infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (examing
compatibility requirement of routine use exemption).
11. See, e.g., Comment, The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview, 1976 DUKE LJ. 301, 314
[hereinafter An Overview] (noting potential for serious abuse of routine use exemption); Com-
ment, Narrowing the "Routine Use" Exemption to the Privacy Act of 1974, 14 U. MIcH.J.L. REF. 126,
132-33 (1980) [hereinafter Narrowing the "Routine Use" Exemption] (examining problems
presented by routine use exemption); Note, The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview and Critique,
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 667, 684-85 [hereinafter Oveniew and Critique] (recognizing that exemp-
tions, especially routine use exemption, destroy individual's control over personal
information).
12. See infra notes 136-86 and accompanying text (discussing failure of OMB and federal
agencies to oversee and to enforce Privacy Act).
13. See infra notes 187-215 and accompanying text (discussing limited success of Con-
gress in preventing abuse of routine use exemption).
14. See infra notes 226-80 and accompanying text (discussingjudicial efforts at combating
abuse of routine use exemption).
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This Comment evaluates the extent to which the Privacy Act has
succeeded in safeguarding individual privacy through an examina-
tion of the application of the routine use exemption. Part I traces
the origins of the constitutional right to privacy and examines its
limited application to the collection and dissemination of personal
information by the federal government. Part II surveys relevant
portions of the Privacy Act, including provisions designed to protect
individual privacy. Part III explores the disparate legislative history
of the Privacy Act generally and the routine use exemption specifi-
cally. Part IV finds federal agency and OMB implementation and
oversight of the Privacy Act wanting. Part V examines the marginal
effect of congressional oversight. Part VI reviews judicial efforts to
restrain abuse of the routine use exemption. This Comment con-
cludes that although an important first step toward safeguarding in-
dividual privacy, the Privacy Act, left to the courts, is impotent
without more effective oversight and enforcement by Cong'ess and
the federal agencies.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Justice Brandeis defined the constitutional right to privacy as "the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men." 15 Because the United States
Constitution does not provide an explicit right to privacy, 16 its de-
velopment has been slow and irregular.1 7 The Supreme Court con-
tinues to grapple with the nature and scope of the constitutional
15. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
In 1890, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren first identified the right to privacy. Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 213 (1890). After exploring the nature
and scope of the right to privacy, the authors concluded that "[ilt is the unwarranted invasion
of individual privacy which is reprehended, and to be, so far as possible, prevented." Id. at
214-15. While commentators differ on the precise wording of the definition of privacy, most
recognize the individual's right to determine what personal information is to be shared with
others. See, e.g., A. BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1 (1970) (defining privacy as "the
rightful claim of the individual to determine the extent to which he wishes to share of himself
[and] the individual's right to control dissemination of information about himself"); A.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy as "the claim of individuals... to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communi-
cated to others"); Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MIcHs. L. REV. 971,
1225 (1975) (defining privacy as "the right to control the flow of information concerning the
details of one's individuality"); Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 281
(1974) (defining privacy as "control over when and by whom the various parts of us can be
sensed by others").
16. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (noting right to privacy not found in any
specific constitutional guarantee); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (finding no explicit
mention of right to privacy in Constitution).
17. See Seng, The Constitution and Informational Privacy, or How So-Called Conservatives Counte-
nance Governmental Intrusion into a Person's Private Affairs, 18J. MARSHALL L. REV. 871, 875 (1985)
(concluding privacy decisions reflect Supreme Court's schizophrenia on right to privacy).
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right to privacy. 18
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe 19 distinguished be-
tween the "interest in independence in making certain kinds of im-
portant decisions" and the "individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters." 20 The former interest has been
identified as "privacy of autonomy," while the latter has been
termed "disclosural privacy." 21 The Court has recognized a consti-
tutional right to privacy of autonomy in decisions relating to mar-
riage, 22  procreation, 23  contraception, 24  family relationships, 25
18. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152 (finding only fundamental individual rights pro-
tected under right of personal privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)
(recognizing zones of privacy).
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of"a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152. After
surveying earlier cases basing the right to privacy on various constitutional provisions such as
the first amendment, Stanley v. ,Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); the fourth and fifth
amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350
(1967); the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85; the ninth amend-
ment, idL at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); and the fourteenth amendment, Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), the Court concluded that only individual rights deemed
" 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' " are found in the guarantee of
personal privacy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
In Griswold, the Supreme Court found that "[v]arious guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] cre-
ate zones of privacy." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Specifically, the Court recognized zones of
privacy formed by the first amendment right of association, the third amendment prohibition
against quartering of soldiers in homes during peace time without consent, the fourth amend-
ment right of individuals to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure, and the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination. Id.
19. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
20. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); see infra note 33 (discussing Supreme
Court's failure in Whalen to find violation of constitutional right to privacy based on either
interest).
21. See Project, supra note 15, at 1283 (exploring constitutional basis of disclosural pri-
vacy and privacy of autonomy). While never invoked by the Supreme Court, the disclosural/
autonomy language provides a useful and insightful framework with which to distinguish the
Court's privacy decisions.
22. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing freedom of choice to marry
protected by fourteenth amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
(recognizing right to privacy in marriage).
23. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing procreation and
marriage as basic civil rights); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding right to privacy
protects woman's decision whether or not to terminate pregnancy). But see Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (upholding state law authorizing forced sterilization of insane and imbe-
cile prison inmates).
24. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (recognizing right to privacy as
freedom "from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (invalidat-
ing state statute prohibiting use of contraceptives as impermissible invasion of right to privacy
in marriage).
25. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944) (recognizing parental au-
thority over children and child-rearing as sacred, private interest).
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obscene material in the home,26 and child rearing and education. 27
Although the Court has continued to develop a right to privacy of
autonomy, it seldom has advanced the right to disclosural privacy.
28
Usually associated with the first 29 and fourth amendments 0 to the
United States Constitution, disclosural privacy concerns the right of
an individual to control the flow of personal information. 3' The
Supreme Court rarely has recognized a constitutional right to dis-
closural privacy,3 2 and has yet to find the right violated.33 Further,
26. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1965) (recognizing right to privacy in
what one reads at home).
27. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing right of
parents to direct upbringing and education of children).
28. Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (failing to recognize constitutional
right to privacy preventing public disclosure of personal arrest information) and Seng, supra
note 17, at 874 (finding little judicial protection of right to disclosural privacy after Paul) with
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 609 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (asserting no "general
interest in freedom from disclosure of private information") and Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455 n.18 (1977) (noting that in joining Court's opinion, Justice
Stewart "adheres to his views on privacy as expressed in his concurring opinion in Whalen").
In Paul, the Court held that respondent's claim that the state could not publicly disclose an
official arrest record was "far afield" of its earlier privacy decisions. Paul, 424 U.S. at 713.
Distinguishing respondent's claim based on the right to disclosural privacy from its earlier
decisions recognizing the right to privacy of autonomy, the Court declined to expand its ear-
lier privacy decisions, none of which recognized respondent's claim to disclosural privacy. Id.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan characterized the Court's opinion as an implicit repudiation of
a substantial body of case law, resulting in the failure to recognize a constitutional privacy
interest in reputation. Id. at 729 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63, 466 (1958) (invalidating state statute
mandating that private association disclose member names as violative of due process clause
of fourteenth amendment and its protection of right to privacy of association); see also Note,
The Interest in Limited Disclosure of Personal Information: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 36 VAND. L. REv.
139, 151-53 (1983) [hereinafter A Constitutional Analysis] (examining first amendment origins
of constitutional interest in limited disclosure).
30. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967) (holding evidence ob-
tained from listening and recording device outside of phone booth, privacy of which defend-
ant justifiably relied upon, violated fourth amendment); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (advocating broader interpretation of fourth
amendment to prohibit home telephone wire tap and "every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed"); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (invalidating statute authorizing court-ordered com-
pulsory production of personal papers as unreasonable search and seizure under fourth
amendment); see also A Constitutional Analysis, supra note 29, at 154-59 (examining fourth
amendment origins of constitutional interest in limited disclosure); Note, The Concept of Privacy
and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MxcH.J.L. REF. 154, 189 (1972) (concluding that fourth amend-
ment right to privacy cases reflect confusion and inconsistency).
31. See A Constitutional Analysis, supra note 29, at 177-82 (examining scope of disclosural
privacy); Project, supra note 15, at 1283 (exploring right to disclosural privacy).
32. See A Constitutional Analysis, supra note 29, at 176-79 (finding basis for constitutional
right to disclosural privacy only in Whalen and Nixon).
33. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (failing to find constitutional right to
disclosural privacy violated); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,457-59,465
(1977) (finding no unconstitutional invasion of right to disclosural privacy).
In Whalen, the Court upheld a state statute requiring disclosure of private medical informa-
tion to state authorities. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04. The Court found it significant that limi-
tations placed on the disclosure of medical information made public exposure unlikely. Id. at
600-02. Of importance was the Court's recognition of the threat to individual privacy posed
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the Court has not detailed the requirements of.a successful claim
based on a constitutional right to disclosural privacy.3 4 Because the
Court has neither consistently recognized a constitutional right to,
by government collection of personal information. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
stated:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive gov-
ernment files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security
benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces and the
enforcement of the criminal laws, all require the orderly preservation of great quanti-
ties of information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embar-
rassing or harmful if disclosed.
Id. at 605. Having recognized the potential threat to individual privacy, the Court refused to
decide the issue. Id. at 605-06.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan examined the restrictions placed on dissemina-
tion of medical information by the New York statute under scrutiny and found sufficient safe-
guards against unwarranted disclosure. Id. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan cautioned that a constitutionally protected privacy right would be implicated if the
restrictions were not in place and the medical information was broadly disseminated by the
state. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). If a protected privacy interest was threatened, the
state would be required to establish a compelling state interest to justify deprivation of the
right to privacy. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). In response to Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinionJustice Stewart wrote a separate concurring opinion asserting that the Court
had not recognized a "general interest in freedom from disclosure of private information."
Id. at 609 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Writing for the majority in Nixon, Justice Brennan considered a disclosural privacy claim
involving the Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act (Preservation Act). Pub. L.
No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988)). Under the Preserva-
tion Act, the Administrator of General Services was directed to take custody of Nixon's presi-
dential papers and supervise their screening to determine which papers the government
would maintain. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 429. Reviewing the Preservation Act's screening process,
Justice Brennan stressed that the Preservation Act was drafted to minimize an invasion of
privacy. Id. at 464. Justice Brennan concluded that no "less restrictive means" existed to
accomplish the purpose of the Preservation Act, and Nixon's "legitimate expectation in pri-
vacy" had not been violated. Id. at 464-65.
Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the Preservation Act should "be subjected to
the most searching kind ofjudicial scrutiny," given its intrusion into highly personal commu-
nications. Id. at 526 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Balancing the government's interest in disclo-
sure against the individual's interest in privacy, the Chief Justice concluded that the
individual's right to privacy must prevail against impermissible government intrusion. Id. at
534-36 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
Although the Court failed in Whalen and Nixon to find that a constitutionally protected right
to disclosural privacy had been violated, the Court has found that a similar statutorily pro-
tected privacy right was violated under the Freedom of Information Act. See Department of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989). In Reporters
Committee, the Court recognized a privacy interest "in avoiding disclosure of personal matters"
contained in an FBI criminal rap sheet. Id. Weighing the public interest in disclosure against
the individual interest in privacy, the Court found the former at its nadir and the latter at its
apex. Id. at 480. The Court concluded that disclosure of law-enforcement records was an
unwarranted invasion of privacy. Id.
34. See Seng, supra note 17, at 879 (concluding that both Whalen and Nixon recognize
right to freedom from unrestrained government disclosure of personal information, but find-
ing no clear understanding of requirements for right to apply). Although the Supreme Court
has not outlined the requirements for raising a constitutional right to disclosural privacy, the
Court appears to have determined the appropriate judicial standard of review to be applied.
See A Constitutional Analysis, supra note 29, at 192-93 (concluding Court applies heightened
scrutiny analysis, balancing individual's interest in non-disclosure against government's inter-
est in disclosure).
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nor articulated a working definition of disclosural privacy, federal
judicial protection has been marginal.35
While the language of the United States Constitution has re-
strained judicial development of the right to privacy, state constitu-
tions have explicitly recognized the right to privacy.3 6 Although
state recognition of the right to privacy has afforded individuals lim-
ited protection from state action, federal action has remained unaf-
fected.37 Absent an enforceable constitutional right to privacy in
personal information held by the federal government, congressional
legislation offered the only remaining safeguard. With the Privacy
Act of 1974, Congress attempted to provide individuals needed pro-
tection against government invasion of privacy in personal
information.
3 8
35. See supra note 33 (examining Supreme Court decisions where disclosural privacy
claims failed); A Constitutional Analysis, supra note 29, at 172-74 (finding uncertainty in lower
court decisions considering right to disclosural privacy); see alsoJ.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080,
1089 (6th Cir. 1981) (declining to construe isolated statements in Whalen and Nixon beyond
their context recognize general constitutional right to disclosural privacy where state statute
provided for compilation and dissemination ofjuvenile social histories to state agencies and
social and religious organizations, absent clear direction from Supreme Court); Saint
Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1981) (refusing
to recognize violation of privacy interest in state statute requiring that health care providers
publicly disclose cost information); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570,
580 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing disclosural privacy interest in employee medical records, but
holding that strong public interest in disclosure together with minimal intrusion on privacy
was constitutionally acceptable).
36. See Seng, supra note 17, at 889-91 (reviewing state constitutions recognizing right to
privacy); Project, supra note 15, at 1242-69 (examining state constitutional and statutory pro-
tection of privacy); see also G. Trubow, "The Development and Status of 'InFormation Privacy'
Law and Policy in the United States," Invited Papers on Privacy: Law, Ethics, and Technology,
National Symposium on Personal Privacy and Information Technology, 1981 ABA Sec. Indiv. Rights
and Responsibilities, Committee on the Right to Privacy 6 (finding effectiveness of some 20
general state privacy laws "narrow and relatively insignificant"). Seegenerally R. SMirr, COMPI-
LATION OF STATE & FEDERAL PRivACY LAws (1988) (presenting comprehensive examination of
state laws providing privacy protection).
37. The United States Constitution protects individuals against government but not pri-
vate action; protection from private action is left to the states. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350-51 (1967). At the time of its adoption, the Privacy Act was considered a necessary
complement to state and municipal laws protecting individual privacy. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1183], reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRI-
vACy, supra note 8, at 170. State efforts to guarantee and safeguard the right to privacy is
rendered ineffective, however, once personal information becomes integrated into federal in-
formation systems. Id.
38. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (Congreesional Findings and State-
ment of Purpose) (recognizing right to privacy as "a personal and fundamental right pro-
tected by the Constitution of the United States"). For a sampling of other congressional
efforts to protect informational privacy see Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1988)) (providing cable
subscribers opportunity to limit disclosure and check accuracy of personal information); Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 3401 (1988)) (proscribing procedures for federal agencies seeking to gain access to
private bank records); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-4555, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988)) (making individual tax return information private,
with limited exceptions); Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
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II. THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
The Privacy Act of 1974 attempted to strike a delicate balance be-
tween the government's need to gather and to use personal infor-
mation and the individual's competing need to maintain control
over such personal information.3 9 In furtherance of these compet-
ing goals, the Privacy Act requires every federal agency4° maintain-
ing a record4' on an individual42 within a system of records43 to:
(1) permit the individual to control the use and dissemination of
information contained in the record;44 (2) permit the individual to
review, to correct, or to amend information contained in the rec-
ord;45 (3) regulate and restrict the collection, maintenance, use, and
380, 88 Stat. 484 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (1988)) (requiring schools and
colleges to grant students and parents access to student records and prescribing procedures
for verification and correction of information); Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-83,
87 Stat. 97 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3701 (1988)) (requiring state criminal justice
information systems to ensure privacy and security of personal information); Fair Credit Re-
porting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (1988)) (proscribing access, verification, correction, and disclosure guidelines pertain-
ing to personal credit information maintained by federal agencies).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 4 (recognizing attempted delicate balance
between need of individual to protect personal information furnished to government and
need of government to access personal information required to function properly), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 297; Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amend-
ments to the Federal Privacy Act, 120 CONG. REC. 40,405, 40,881 (1974) [hereinafter Analysis of
Compromise Amendments] (noting difficulty of balancing "public's right to know about the con-
duct of their government and their equally important right to have information which is per-
sonal to them maintained with the greatest degree of confidence by Federal agencies"),
reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 858, 989. The Analysis of Compromise
Amendments was ordered printed in the Congressional Record by both the Senate, 120 CONG. REC.
40,405-09 (1974), and the House, 120 CONG. REC. 40,881-83 (1974). Both printings appear
in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 858-66, 987-94. All cites to Analysis of Compromise
Amendments are to the House printing in the Congressional Record and its reprinting in SOURCE
BOOK ON PRIVACY.
40. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) (1988). The Privacy Act adopts the defini-
tion provided in FOIA that defines "agency" as including "any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other estab-
lishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the
President), or any independent regulatory agency." Id. § 552a(f).
41. Id. § 552a(a)(4). "Record" is defined as
any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is main-
tained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial transac-
tions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his
name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to
the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a photograph.
Id.
42. Id. § 552a(a)(2). "Individual" is defined as "a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence." Id.
43. Id. § 552a(a)(5). "System of records" is defined as "a group of any records under the
control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by
some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual."
Id.
44. Id. § 552a (Congressional Findings and Statement of Purpose); see infra notes 48-61
and accompanying text (discussing exemptions to disclosure prohibition).
45. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (Congressional Findings and Statement
965
966 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:957
dissemination of information in the record; 46 and (4) be subject to
civil suit for specified violations of the Privacy Act.47 Collectively,
these safeguards are designed to protect individual privacy, while
preserving the government's ability to gather and to use personal
information.
The first safeguard prohibits any federal agency from disclosing
any record contained in a system of records, without written consent
of the individual to whom the record pertains.48 The expansive
scope of this prohibition on nonconsensual disclosure, however, is
subject to numerous exemptions.4 9 Specific exemptions exist for
disclosure to agency employees, 50 the Bureau of the Census,5' the
National Archives and Records Administration, 52 Congress or its
committees, 53 the Comptroller General, 54 and the consumer protec-
tion agencies.55 Also exempted is disclosure required under the
Freedom of Information Act,56 for statistical research5 7 or law en-
forcement purposes,58 in response to emergency circumstances, 59
of Purpose); see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing guidelines allowing indi-
vidual access to personal records).
46. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (Congressional Findings and Statement
of Purpose); see infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on federal
agency collection and use of personal information).
47. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (Congressional Findings and Statement
of Purpose); see infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing available civil and crimi-
nal remedies).
48. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988).
49. Id. § 552a(b)(1)-(12).
50. Id. § 552a(b)(1). Section 552a(b)(1) provides that information may be disclosed "to
those officers and employees of the agency which maintain the record who have a need for the
record in the performance of their duties." Id.
51. Id. § 552a(b)(4). Section 552a(b)(4) provides in pertinent part that information may
be disclosed "to the Bureau of the Census for purposes of planning or carrying out a census
or survey or related activity ...." Id.
52. Id. § 552a(b)(6). Section 552a(b)(6) provides that information may be disclosed "to
the National Archives and Records Administration as a record which has sufficient historical
or other value to warrant its continued preservation by the United States Government, or for
evaluation by the Archivist of the United States or the designee of the Archivist to determine
whether the record has such value." Id.
53. Id. § 552a(b)(9). Section 552a(b)(9) provides that information may be disclosed "to
either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction, any committee or
subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or subcommittee of any such joint
committee." Id.
54. Id. § 552a(b)(10). Section 552a(b)(10) provides that information may be disclosed
"to the Comptroller General, or any of his authorized representatives, in the course of the
performance of the duties of the General Accounting Office." Id.
55. Id. § 552a(b)(12).
56. Id. § 552a(b)(2).
57. Id. § 552a(b)(5). Section 552a(b)(5) provides that information may be disclosed "to
a recipient who has provided the agency with advance adequate written assurance that the
record will be used solely as a statistical research or reporting record, and the record is to be
transferred in a form that is not individually identifiable." Id.
58. Id. § 552a(b)(7). Section 552a(b)(7) provides that information may be disclosed
to another agency or to an instrumentality of any governmental jurisdiction within or
under the control of the United States for a civil or criminal law enforcement activity
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or pursuant to court order.60 Finally, the broadest exemption is for
disclosure pursuant to a "routine use.
' '61
The second safeguard provides that every federal agency must
grant the individual access to pertinent records upon request.
6 2
Specifically, the federal agency must permit the individual to re-
view63 or to request amendment4 of any record pertaining to the
individual. Should the federal agency fail to amend the record, the
individual may request the federal agency to review its decision.65 If
after review the federal agency refuses to amend the record, the in-
dividual may seek judicial review of the decision.
66
The third safeguard regulates and limits the collection, mainte-
nance, use, and dissemination of personal information by federal
agencies.67 Federal agencies may gather only that information re-
quired to accomplish the purpose for its collection. 68 Information
must be collected directly from the individual whenever practica-
ble69 and, in any event, must be maintained accurately and com-
pletely.70 Every federal agency must publish a notice in the Federal
Register describing each system of records it maintains and each rou-
tine use it employs. 71 Federal agencies also must keep an accurate
if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the agency or instrumentality
has made a written request to the agency which maintains the record specifying the
particular portion desired and the law enforcement activity for which the record is
sought.
Id.
59. Id. § 552a(b)(8). Section 552a(b)(8) provides that information may be disclosed "to
a person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety of
an individual if upon such disclosure notification is transmitted to the last known address of
such an individual." Id.
60. Id. § 552a(b)(11).
61. Id. § 552a(b)(3). "Routine use" is defined, "with respect to the disclosure of a rec-
ord, [as] the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which
it was collected." Id. § 552a(a)(7). Individuals providing information to a federal agency
must be informed of the routine uses for which the information may be used. Id.
§ 552a(e)(3)(C). Additionally, such routine uses must appear annually in the Federal Register.
Id. § 552a(e)(4)(D).
62. Id. § 552a(d).
63. Id. § 552a(d)(1).
64. Id. § 552a(d)(2).
65. Id. § 552a(d)(3).
66. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(A).
67. Id. § 552a(c), (e), (0.
68. Id. § 552a(e)(1). Specifically, the purpose must be one required by statute or execu-
tive order. Id. Unless exclusively authorized by statute or by the individual, no record may be
maintained which describes the individual's exercise of first amendment rights. Id.
§ 552a(e)(7).
69. Id. § 552a(e)(2).
70. Id. § 552a(e)(5). Prior to dissemination of any record, the federal agency must make
reasonable efforts to assure the accuracy and completeness of the record. Id. § 552a(e)(6).
71. Id. § 552a(e)(4). Notice must be given in the Federal Register of "each routine use of
the records contained in the system [of records], including the categories of users and the
purpose of such use." Id. § 552a(e)(4)(D). In addition, any federal agency that proposes to
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accounting of all records disclosed and the purpose and nature of
such disclosures. 72 In addition, federal agencies must promulgate
rules of conduct for their employees charged with the maintenance
of any record or system of records73 and must establish procedures
to review the requests of individuals to amend their records.
74
Although the third safeguard restricts the collection and use of
personal information by federal agencies, general and specific ex-
emptions allow the heads of federal agencies to promulgate rules
that exempt their federal agency's systems of records from provi-
sions of the Privacy Act.75 The general exemptions provide that sys-
tems of records maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency or
criminal law enforcement agencies may be excused from compliance
with the access, collection, and use provisions of the Privacy Act.
76
In addition, there are seven specific exemptions that excuse systems
of records from compliance with these provisions of the Privacy
Act.77 Neither the general nor the specific exemptions excuse ob-
servance of the nondisclosure and remedial provisions.
78
The final safeguard makes civil remedies available to any individ-
ual bringing suit against a federal agency for specified violations of
the Privacy Act.7 9 The Privacy Act recognizes four violations. The
first is for a federal agency's failure to amend the individual's record
as requested, or to review the individual's request.8 0 The second
arises from a federal agency's refusal to permit review of the individ-
ual's records. 8' The third is for a federal agency's failure to main-
tain the individual's records properly, resulting in an adverse
establish or to amend a system of records is required to provide advance notice to the House
Committee on Government Operations, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and
OMB for evaluation. Id. § 552a(r).
72. Id. § 552a(c). Accountings are made available upon request to any individual named
in the record. Id. § 552a(c)(3).
73. Id. § 552a(e)(9).
74. Id. § 552a(D.
75. Id. § 552a(j), (k).
76. Id. § 552a(j).
77. Id. § 552a(k)(1)-(7). The specific exemptions apply to record systems containing:
classified material, investigatory materials for law enforcement agencies, information used to
protect the President, statistical records, investigatory materials for civil employment, military
service or government contracts, employment testing materials, and armed service evaluative
materials for promotion. Id.
78. Id. § 552a(j), (k); see Tijerina v. Waiters, 821 F.2d 789, 795-97 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that general exemption does not exclude compliance with civil remedies provisions).
79. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1988).
80. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(A). The court shall review the matter de novo and may order the
federal agency to amend the individual's record. Id. § 552a(g)(2)(A).
81. Id. § 552a(g)(l)(B). The court may enjoin the federal agency from withholding the
record and order the federal agency to produce it, or the court may examine the contents of
the record to determine whether the record is exempt from disclosure. Id. § 552a(g)(3)(A).
The court shall review the matter de novo and the burden is on the federal agency to sustain its
action. Id.
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determination against the individual.8 2 The last violation for which
civil remedies are provided is worded broadly to encompass a fed-
eral agency's failure to adhere to any provision of the Privacy Act
that causes the individual to suffer an adverse effect.8 3
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Although Congress addressed distinct informational privacy con-
cerns in earlier legislation,8 4 the Privacy Act of 1974 was Congress'
first attempt at a comprehensive plan for safeguarding individual
privacy in personal information.8 5 The Privacy Act was preceded by
exhaustive congressional hearings on individual privacy,8 6 and the
consideration of over 100 alternative privacy bills.8 7 Of still greater
importance was a 1973 Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare report proposing a Code of Fair Information Practices
(Code).88 The Code figured prominently in the legislative drafting
process of the Privacy Act.
89
82. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(C). Court costs, attorney fees, and actual damages sustained by the
individual are available for section 552a(g)(1)(C) and 552a(g)(1)(D) violations where the court
determines that the federal agency's actions were intentional or willful. Id. § 552a(g)(4).
83. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
In addition to civil remedies, the court may impose criminal penalties upon any federal
agency employee or person violating the Privacy Act. Id. § 552a(i). Any federal agency em-
ployee who knowingly and willfully discloses personal records, or who willfully maintains a
system of records without complying with the notice requirements, is subject to criminal pen-
alties. Id. § 552a(i)(1), (2). Any person who knowingly and willfully requests or obtains per-
sonal records under false pretenses is also subject to criminal penalties. Id. § 552a(i)(3).
Persons subject to criminal penalties may be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a maxi-
mum fine of $5,000. Id. § 552a(i)(l)-(3).
84. See Project, supra note 15, at 1297-303 (reviewing earlier congressional initiatives
protecting privacy in personal information); Hanus & Relyea, supra note 2, at 567-69 (discuss-
ing prior congressional measures aimed at guarding privacy); see also supra note 2 (examining
earlier congressional privacy hearings and legislation).
85. 120 CONG. REC. 40,880 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorhead), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 986.
86. See supra note 2 (surveying congressional hearings on personal privacy). Senator Sam
Ervin, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and chief sponsor of the Pri-
vacy Act, held hearings on personal privacy for several years before the Privacy Act was
adopted by Congress. See FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITrUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at
iii-v (reviewing efforts of Senator Ervin to advance privacy legislation).
87. Comment, Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 275, 275
(1975).
88. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PER-
SONAL DATA Sys. xxiii-xxvi (1973) [hereinafter HEW REPORT]. A product of the Secretary's
Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, the Code addressed significant
problems arising from the application of computer technology to the collection, maintenance,
use, and dissemination of personal information. See id. at x-xi (describing principles upon
which Code rests).
89. See 2J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE, ch. 20.02, at 20-7 to -8 (1989)
(noting deference shown Code in drafting process); S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37 (citing
favorably to Code throughout report), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8; H.R.
REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 7 (stating House bill embodies major principles of Code),
reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 300. A comparison of the Code to the
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A. House and Senate Compromise
The final version of the Privacy Act was the result of a last minute
compromise between competing Senate and House bills.90 Com-
mentators critical of congressional haste claim that the compromise
produced an act that lacks internal consistency and clear legislative
intent.9' Moreover, the compromise diluted the protection afforded
Privacy Act reveals the influence of the former over the latter. Indeed, the Privacy Act embod-
ies all five principles upon which the Code was based: (1) there must be no secret personal
data systems; (2) an individual must be able to determine whether personal information is
held in personal data systems and how it is used; (3) an individual must be able to exercise
control over the use of personal information held in personal data systems; (4) an individual
must be able to correct errors in information held in personal data systems; and (5) any
agency with control over personal information must be able to guarantee its reliability and
protect it from misuse. HEW REPORT, supra note 88, at xx-xxi.
90. Compare S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 36,917-21 (1974) [hereinafter
S. 3418], reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 334-74 with H.R. 16,373, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 36,652-54 (1974) [hereinafter H.R. 16,373], reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 258-93.
The Senate passed S. 3418 on November 21, 1974 by a vote of 74 to 9, with 17 senators not
voting. 120 CONG. REC. 36,917 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at
838. On the same day, the House passed H.R. 16,373 by a vote of 353 to 1, with 80 repre-
sentatives not voting. Id. at 36,976-77, reprinted in SOURCE BoOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at
981. The House took up S. 3418, but retained only the enacting clause. Id. at 39,204, reprinted
in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 984. After substituting the House language, the
House passed S. 3418 on December 11, 1974. Id.
Because insufficient time remained in the session to submit the competing versions to a
conference committee, an informal process was adopted to reconcile the bills. Hanus &
Relyea, supra note 2, at 572. Staff members from the Senate and House committees and the
principal sponsors engaged in a series of informal meetings to reach a compromise. Id.
House sponsor Representative Moorhead explained the informal procedure by which differ-
ences in the two bills were reconciled:
Because of the lateness in the session and the pressures on Members of both bodies
due to other pressing legislative business, we determined that it would not be possi-
ble to resolve the complex differences between the two bills in a conference commit-
tee. Yet the sponsors and floor managers of the legislation on both sides firmly
agreed that it was imperative that final action be taken on privacy legislation before
the end of Congress.
... [Compromise] amendments were informally negotiated by the staffs of the House
and Senate committees and are based on agreements between the principal sponsors
of the privacy bills in the two bodies.
120 CONG. REC. 40,880 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorhead), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 985-86; see id. at 40,400 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (reporting reconcil-
iation process), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 845-46. As amended,
the Senate passed S. 3418 on December 17, 1974 by a vote of 77 to 8, with 15 senators not
voting. Id. at 40,413, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 877. The next day
the House passed the amended S. 3418. Id. at 40,886, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY,
supra note 8, at 1001. In lieu of a conference report, the Analysis of Compromise Amendments was
introduced into the Congressional Record. Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at
40,881-83, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 987-94. President Ford
signed the amended bill on December 31, 1974. See supra note 6 (reviewing President's re-
marks upon signing Privacy Act).
91. See 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 89, ch. 20.03, at 20-9 (noting flaws in Privacy Act as
compromise legislation and questioning existence of congressional intent); Oversight of the ri-
vacy Act of 1974: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings on Oversight of Privacy Act] (statement of Ron-
ald Plesser) (stating Privacy Act is "its own worst enemy"). As one commentator remarked:
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to individual privacy in personal information. 92
The House bill embodied a conservative approach to safeguard-
ing individual privacy in personal information.93 The bill's restraint
is attributable to House efforts to accommodate and to involve the
executive branch in the drafting process. 94 In order to facilitate the
orderly conduct of government, the House bill proposed a "routine
use" exemption to the nondisclosure provision.95 The exemption
was adopted to quell fears that the nondisclosure provision would
prohibit "routine" transfers of information by federal agencies. 96 In
addition, the exemption precluded the need for Congress to detail
every appropriate use of information.97
Notice provisions in the House bill required federal agencies to
The consequence of this hasty and haphazard legislative process is an internally in-
consistent statute with no reliable indication of congressional intent. The original
committee reports are of limited value in interpreting the final statute. The only
reliable legislative history consists of a rather skimpy staff analysis .... Conse-
quently, courts are likely to have great difficulty interpreting the Act and vigorous
enforcement may be impossible.
R. BOUCHARD &J. FRANKLIN, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACT
45 (1980).
92. See Project, supra note 15, at 1305-40 (examining deficiencies and interpretative diffi-
culties in Privacy Act including federal agency evasion of disclosure requirements, severe limi-
tations on access to civil remedies, and failure to draft narrow exemptions); Ehlke, supra note
1, at 829 (finding Privacy Act ambitious in theory, but ineffective in practice).
93. See 2J. O'RELLY, supra note 89, ch. 20.03, at 20-11 (stating that House bill was more
conservative than Senate bill).
94. Id. at 20-11 to -12 (noting involvement of OMB and Privacy Committee during draft-
ing process and high degree of cooperation); Hanus & Relyea, supra note 2, at 571 (finding
that House subcommittee staff was sensitive to Privacy Act's impact on infrrmation-handling
procedures of federal agencies and, thus, was inclined to defer to executive branch expertise);
H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 11 (explaining technical details of House bill were
worked out through informal meetings with OMB staff and Privacy Committee), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 304; 120 CONG. REc. 36,966-97 (1974) (statement
of Rep. Moorhead) (conveying President Ford's support for House bill), reprinted in SOURCE
Boox ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 956-57. Unlike the House, the Senate involved the execu-
tive branch only marginally in the drafting process. See 2J. O'REiLLY, supra note 89, ch. 20.03,
at 20-12 (recognizing that Senate involvement in Watergate proceedings may explain lack of
interaction with executive branch); Hanus & Relyea, supra note 2, at 570-71 (hypothesizing
that executive branch cooperation in Senate bill was limited because of Senate involvement in
Watergate investigation).
95. H.R. 16,373, supra note 90, § 552a(b)(2), 120 CONG. REC. 36,653, reprinted in SOURCE
Boox ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 279; see H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 12 (explaining
routine use will prevent impeding orderly government or delaying services), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 305; see Records Maintained by Government Agencies,
supra note 2, at 131 (statement of H. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice) (observing House bill "could materially interfere with the agency's
performance of its mission in ways other than increased administrative work").
96. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 12, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
note 8, at 305. Federal agencies complained that because they could not obtain consent from
every individual whose information was subject to routine transfer, they would be prevented
from making useful and efficient exchanges of information. Id.; see infra notes 123-24, 130-35
and accompanying text (discussing legislative origins and scope of routine use exemption).
97. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,967 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorhead) (noting routine use
exemption would preclude "impossible legislative task" of attempting "to set forth all of the
appropriate uses"), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 957.
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inform individuals of the nature and scope of personal information
maintained by the government and the purposes of its collection
and use.98 The House bill also professed to guarantee relief to in-
jured individuals99 and advocated private enforcement as an effec-
tive check against federal agency abuses. 100 The restrictive
language of the House bill's remedial provisions, however, pre-
vented aggressive private enforcement and limited the relief avail-
able to injured individuals.' 0 '
In contrast to the House bill, the Senate bill was more aggressive
and its scope was more expansive.10 2 By holding federal agencies
strictly liable for violations, the Senate bill favored the individual
and allowed greater access to civil remedies.103 The Senate bill also
encouraged private enforcement by providing injunctive relief and
punitive damages where appropriate.'0 4 In addition, the Senate bill
98. H.R. 16,373, supra note 90, § 552a(e), 120 CONG. REC. 36,653, reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 283-85; see H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 15-16
(discussing notice provisions), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 308-09.
99. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 17, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, Supra
note 8, at 310.
100. See id. at 15 (relying on "constant vigilance" of individuals supported by "legal re-
dress" to combat abuse by federal agencies), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note
8, at 308.
101. H.R. 16,373, supra note 90, § 552a(g), 120 CONG. REC. 36,654, reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK ON PRIVACY supra note 8, at 287-89; see H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 17-18
(requiring individual to establish adverse effect, causally related to willful, arbitrary, or capri-
cious federal agency action), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 310-11. If
successful, relief was limited to actual damages, court costs, and attorney fees. H.R. 16,373,
supra note 90, § 552a(g)(3), 120 CONG. REC. 36,654 reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY,
supra note 8, at 288. Several members of the House Foreign Operations and Government
Information Subcommittee wrote separately, arguing that effective private deterrence re-
quired the restoration of punitive and liquidated damages. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8,
at 38, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 330.
102. See S. 3418, supra note 90, §§ 202(a), (b), 301(2)-(5), 120 CONG. REC. 36,920-21
(providing expansive coverage of nondisclosure provision and recognizing few exemptions),
reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 359-60, 367. Most importantly, the
Senate bill made no exemption for routine use disclosures. Id. § 202(b), 120 CONG. REC.
36,920, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 359-60; see S. REP. No. 1183,
supra note 37, at 20 (stating exemptions are to be kept to absolute minimum), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 173. In addition, the Senate bill was not restricted
to information systems held by the federal government, but extended to state, local, and pri-
vate information systems. Id. at 17-18, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at
170-71.
103. S.3418, supra note 90, § 303(c), 120 CONG. REC. 36,921, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 371; see S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 82-83 (noting need for
"widest possible citizen enforcement" because of lack of independent enforcement body),
reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 235-36. Compare H.R. 16,373, supra note
90, § 552a(g), 120 CONG. REC. 36,654 (requiring that injured party establish actual personal
damages causally related to willful federal agency action), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRI-
VACY, supra note 8, at 287-89 with S. 3418, supra note 90, § 303, 120 CONG. REC. 36,921 (hold-
ing federal agencies strictly liable for actions), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note
8, at 370-72.
104. S. 3418,supra note 90, § 303(a)-(c), 120 CONG. REC. 36,921, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK
ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 370-71; see S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 16 (recognizing
need for and encouraging private enforcement), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
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authorized the Attorney General to seek an injunction against ex-
isting or threatened violations affecting the public at large. 105 Com-
prehensive notice requirements assisted individuals when exercising
their rights under the Senate bill.'0 6 Finally, the Senate bill pro-
posed the establishment of a Privacy Protection Commission (Pri-
vacy Commission) with broad investigatory and enforcement
powers. '0
7
The Senate's greatest concession in the compromise reached be-
tween the House and Senate bills was its abandonment of the Pri-
vacy Commission. 08 Unable to overcome House and executive
branch opposition, proponents of the Privacy Commission agreed
to a compromise.' 0 9 In place of the Privacy Commission, the Pri-
vacy Act authorized the establishment of a Privacy Protection Study
Commission (Study Commission). 10  Unlike its predecessor, the
Study Commission, stripped of investigatory and enforcement pow-
note 8, at 169; id. at 83 (noting broad availability of damages and injunctive relief), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 236.
105. S. 3418,supra note 90, § 303(b), 120 CONG. REC. 36,921, rep4intedin SOURCE BOOK ON
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 371; see S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 83 (providing enforce-
ment by Attorney General where individual lacks standing or incentive to bring suit), reprinted
in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 236.
106. S. 3418, supra note 90, § 201, 120 CONG. REc. 36,918-19, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK
ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 348-59; see S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 48, 58-59 (recogniz-
ing notice requirements as protection against arbitrary information gathering by govern-
ment), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 201, 211-12.
107. S. 3418, supra note 90, §§ 101-107, 120 CONG. REC. 36,917-18, reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 334-47. The Privacy Commission was authorized to con-
duct inspections, hold hearings, take testimony, issue subpoenas, receive complaints, and take
action as needed. Id. § 105(a), 120 CONG. REC. 36,918, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY,
supra note 8, at 342-43. In addition, the Privacy Commission was required to study govern-
ment data banks and their effect on personal privacy and periodically report its findings to
Congress and the President. Id. §§ 106-107, 120 CONG. REC. 36,918, reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 344-47; see S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 24-26 (rec-
ommending Privacy Commission aid Congress when enacting future privacy legislation and
assume needed oversight role Congress was unable to fulfill), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 177-79; see also id. at 25 (noting rejection of original Senate bill
proposal for establishment of Federal Privacy Board with broad regulatory powers), reprinted
in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 178.
108. Hanus & Relyea, supra note 2, at 572.
109. See id. (noting strong opposition of OMB to Privacy Commission); 2 J. O'REILLY,
supra note 89, ch. 20.03, at 20-12, 20-14 n.29 (recognizing executive branch and House objec-
tion to establishment of another independent agency); 120 CONG. REC. 36,967 (1974) (state-
ment of President Ford) (disfavoring any separate bureaucratic privacy agency), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY supra note 8, at 956-57.
Several members of the House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee broke ranks and supported the Senate proposal to establish an administrative oversight
body with enforcement powers. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 38-39, reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 330-31. The members expressed their concern that
Congress not "repeat the experience of the Freedom of Information Act in holding out rights
to individuals but providing them only with the costly and cumbersome mechanism of ajudi-
cial remedy." Id. at 38, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 330.
110. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Star. 1986, 1905-09, amended by, Pub.
L. No. 95-38, § 5(g), 91 Stat. 179 (1977).
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ers, was directed to study and to report on federal agency protection
of personal information."'1 Although the Privacy Commission's en-
forcement provisions were abandoned, the oversight provisions
were retained and assigned to OMB with instructions to promulgate
guidelines for and to assist in the implementation of the Privacy
Act."12
The adoption of a compromise standard of proof for civil reme-
dies restricted recovery of actual damages to instances of "willful or
intentional" federal agency action. 113 The compromise eliminated
punitive damages, limited injunctive relief, and restricted recovery
of reasonable costs and attorney fees. 114 The notice requirements
from the House and Senate bills were incorporated into the Privacy
Act largely unchanged. 115 Finally, the House "routine use" lan-
guage was adopted as an exemption to the nondisclosure
provision. 116
111. Id. Compare supra note 107 (examining expansive powers and responsibilities of Pri-
vacy Commission) with Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,881 (explaining
restricted role of Study Commission), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at
987. The Study Commission was restricted to a non-renewable two year term as a "study
commission." Id. An effort to grant the Study Commission permanent status failed on the
House floor. 120 CONG. REC. 36,962-65 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
note 8, at 945-52. In addition to preparing an annual report to Congress and the President,
the Study Commission was directed to submit a final report at the conclusion of its term.
Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,881, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRI-
VACY, supra note 8, at 987. In 1977, the Study Commission issued its final report, complete
with an assessment of the Privacy Act and recommendations for its improvement. PRIVACY
PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977) [here-
inafter PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION].
112. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(v) (1988). Section 552a(v) directs the Director
of OMB to:
(1) develop and, after notice and opportunity for public comment, prescribe
guidelines and regulations for the use of agencies in implementing the provisions of
this section; and
(2) provide continuing assistance to and oversight of the implementation of this
section by agencies.
Id
113. Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,882, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK
ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 989-90. The compromise standard of proof was explained as
reflecting the
belief that a finding of willful, arbitrary, or capricious action is too harsh a standard
of proof for an individual to exercise the rights granted by this legislation. Thus the
standard for recovery of damages was reduced to 'willful or intentional' action by an
agency. On a continuum between negligence [(Senate version)] and the very high
standard of willful, arbitrary, or capricious conduct [(House version)], this standard
is viewed as only somewhat greater than gross negligence.
Id.
114. Id.
115. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(C), (4) (1988); see supra note 71 and ac-
companying text (providing statutory language of notice requirements).
116. Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,881, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK
ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 987.
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The compromise dearly favored the House bill1 17 and revealed a
preference for the government's right to gather and to use personal
information over the individual's right to privacy. By adopting a
higher standard of proof for actual damages while limiting the avail-
ability of other damages, the compromise restricted access to civil
remedies and diminished the role of private enforcement. 118 Fur-
thermore, under the compromise, the advisory authority of the
Study Commission was substituted for the investigatory and en-
forcement powers of the Privacy Commission. 1 9 Finally, adoption
of the routine use language freed federal agencies from strict adher-
ence to the nondisclosure provision and introduced a means to cir-
cumvent the Privacy Act. 120 Only the active support and oversight
of Congress and the executive branch could redress the imbalance.
B. The Routine Use Exemption
Routine use language first appeared in the House bill introduced
by Congressman William S. Moorhead, Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information. 12 1
The language was incorporated as an exemption to "one of the
most important, if not the most important, provision of the [House]
bill"-the nondisclosure provision. 122 Under the routine use ex-
emption, federal agencies were permitted to disclose personal infor-
mation without the consent of the individual, provided that the
117. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text (reviewing compromise reached and
finding House provisions favored over competing Senate provisions).
118. The compromise crippled the individual's ability to be made whole in two ways.
First, the higher burden of proof insulated careless or inadvertent disclosures from remedial
action. See S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 24 (noting that "major threat to most Ameri-
cans lies in the inadvertent, careless, and unthinking collection, distribution, and storage of
records"), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 177. Consequently, the stan-
dard of proof ensured that a majority of abuses went unaddressed. See id. Second, damages
were so limited as to remove any incentive to bring suit, except for the most egregious viola-
tions. Id. at 28, repinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 181. These conclusions
are particularly troubling given that both the House and Senate recognized the need for pri-
vate enforcement. See id. at 82 (stressing importance of private enforcement, absent in-
dependent enforcement authority), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 235;
H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 38 (advocating restoration ofpunitive or liquidated dam-
ages to ensure essential private enforcement), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note
8, at 330; see also Project, supra note 15, at 1331 (finding that combination of higher standard
of proof and reduced damages makes impossible fulfillment of congressional purpose of Pri-
vacy Act).
119. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (contrasting powers of Privacy Com-
mission with those of Study Commission).
120. See infra notes 136-68 and accompanying text (examining federal agency abuse of
routine use exemption).
121. H.R. 16,373, supra note 90, § 552a(b)(2), 120 CONG. REc. 36,653, reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 279.
122. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 12, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
note 8, at 305.
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nature and scope of the routine use was published in the Federal Reg-
ister.123 The purpose of the routine use exemption was to facilitate
orderly government conduct by allowing federal agencies to rou-
tinely exchange information for "housekeeping measures."1 24 Rec-
ognizing the possibility for abuse, the House Committee on
Government Operations pledged to oversee vigorously federal
agency use of the exemption.
125
The Senate bill placed greater restrictions on the disclosure of
personal information 126 and recognized fewer exemptions.' 27 Un-
like the House bill, the Senate bill did not provide for a "routine
use" exemption.' 28 The authors of the Senate bill considered such
an exemption, but rejected it due to the potential for misuse.'
29
The compromise reached between the Senate and House bills
adopted the routine use language.' 30 In lieu of a conference report,
123. Id.
124. Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,881, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK
ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 988; see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (examining
concern over impediment to orderly government conduct); Office of Management and
Budget, Privacy Act Implementation Guidelines and Responsibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948,
28,953 (1975) [hereinafter OMB Guidelines] (noting routine use exemption introduced in rec-
ognition of corollary purposes to which collected information may be "appropriate and neces-
sary" for "efficient conduct of government" and "in the best interest of both the individual
and the public"), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 1030. Representative
Moorhead explained the rationale of the exemption:
It would be an impossible legislative task to attempt to set forth all of the appropriate
uses of Federal records about an identifiable individual. It is not the purpose of the
bill to -estrict such ordinary uses of the information. Rather than attempting to spec-
ify each proper use of such records, the bill gives each Federal agency the authority
to set forth the 'routine' purposes for which the records are to be used under the
guidance contained in the committee's report.
In this sense 'routine use' does not encompass merely the common and ordinary
uses to which records are put, but also includes all of the proper and necessary uses
even if such use occurs infrequently.
120 CONG. REC. 36,967 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorhead), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 957.
125. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 12, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
note 8, at 305.
126. S. 3418, supra note 90, § 202(a), 120 CONG. REC. 36,920, (providing that personal
information was not to be disclosed unless individual written consent was obtained, recipient
of information maintained its records in conformity with Privacy Act, and information was
used for purpose for which it was collected), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note
8, at 359.
127. See id. § 202(b)(1)-(4), 120 CONG. REC. 36,920 (recognizing as only exemptions dis-
closure: to agency personnel with need for such information in performance of their duties,
to Bureau of Census, for statistical reporting or research, and pursuant to compelling circum-
stances affecting personal health or safety), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8,
at 359-60; see also S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 20 (stating exemptions are to be kept to
absolute minimum), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 173.
128. S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 68-70, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
note 8, at 221-23.
129. Id. at 69, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 222.
130. See Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,881 (examining and recon-
ciling Senate and House disclosure requirements), rerinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
note 8, at 987-88.
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an Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the
Federal Privacy Act (Analysis of Compromise Amendments) was ordered
printed in the Congressional Record.'3 ' Neither the Analysis of Compro-
mise Amendments nor OMB guidelines promulgated pursuant to the
Privacy Act provide adequate insight into Congress' intent in adopt-
ing the routine use exemption.' 32
The legislative history generally supports an interpretation of the
routine use exemption consistent with the House bill, with one nota-
ble exception. 133 While the House bill permitted the federal agency
discretion when establishing routine uses, the compromise language
required that the routine use be compatible with the purpose for
which the information was collected. 34 OMB guidelines interpret-
ing the routine use language found mere compatibility inadequate
and required that the routine use also "relate" to the purpose for
collection.' 3 5 Given the paucity of legislative history, interpretation
131. See supra note 39 (explaining printing of Analysis of Compromise Amendments in Congres-
sional Record). The Analysis of Compromise Amendments provides in pertinent part:
The House bill contains a provision not provided for in the Senate measure ex-
empting certain disclosures of information from the requirement to obtain prior con-
sent from the subject when the disclosure would be for a 'routine use'. The
compromise would define 'routine use' to mean: 'with respect to the disclosure of a
record, the use of such records for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose
for which it was collected.'
Where the Senate bill would have placed tight restrictions upon the transfer of
personal information between or outside Federal agencies, the House bill, under the
routine use provision, would permit an agency to describe its routine uses in the
Federal Register and then disseminate the information without the consent of the
individual or without applying the standards of accuracy, relevancy, timeliness or
completeness so long as no determination was being made about the subject.
The compromise definition should serve as a caution to agencies to think out in
advance what uses it will make of information. This act is not intended to impose
undue burdens on the transfer of information to the Treasury Department to com-
plete payroll checks, the receipt of information by the Social Security Administration
to complete quarterly posting of accounts, or other such housekeeping measures and
necessarily frequent interagency or intra-agency transfers of information. It is, how-
ever, intended to discourage the unnecessary exchange of information to other per-
sons or to agencies who may not be as sensitive to the collecting agency's reasons for
using and interpreting the material.
Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,881, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRI-
VACY, supra note 8, at 987-88.
132. See supra note 131 (providing discussion of routine use in Analysis of Compromise Amend-
ments); OMB Guidelines, supra note 124, at 28,953 (providing series of excerpts from Congres-
sional Record, but little substantive direction), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note
8, at 1030-31.
133. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (examining limited legislative history
of routine use). When determining Congressional intent, courts have focused on the House
bill. See Perry v. FBI, 759 F.2d 1271, 1279 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding House report "often
the best barometer of Congressional intent"), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 781 F.2d 1294, cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 814 (1986).
134. Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,881, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK
ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 987.
135. OMB Guidelines, supra note 124, at 28,953, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
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of the routine use exemption was left largely to the discretion of the
federal agencies and the courts.
IV. FEDERAL AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION
A. Federal Agency Compliance
Recognizing the limits of congressional oversight and private en-
forcement,13 6 the Senate Committee on Government Operations
concluded that "realistically... the implementation of the Act rests,
finally, with the departments and agencies of the executive branch
and the good faith, ethical conduct and integrity of the Federal em-
ployees who serve in them."' 1 7 In reaching this conclusion, the
Committee failed to acknowledge that compliance with the Privacy
Act conflicted with the fundamental need of federal agencies to
gather and to use information.' 3 8 Entrusting federal agencies with
responsibility for enforcement, therefore, rendered compliance
problematic.' 3 9
The tension between competing institutional and privacy interests
is manifest in the routine use exemption. 40 The exemption was
adopted to facilitate routine transfers of information by federal
agencies, not to allow indiscriminate circumvention of the nondis-
closure provision of the Privacy Act.141 To prevent abuse of the ex-
emption, Congress required federal agencies to provide notice in
the Federal Register of the nature and scope of every routine use.
14 2
note 8, at 1031. Although the literal distinction appears insignificant, it is apparent that OMB
believed something more than mere compatibility was required. Id.
136. S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 28, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
note 8, at 181.
137. Id.; see An Overview, supra note 11, at 326-27 (recognizing limited benefit of congres-
sional oversight and concluding that agencies bear burden of enforcement).
138. See Belair, Agency Implementation of the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act. Im.
pact of the Government's Collection, Maintenance and Dissemination of Personally IdentiLable Information,
I0J. MARSHALLJ. PaRC. & PROc. 465 (1977) (examining impact of Privacy Act upon informa-
tion collection and dissemination efforts by federal agencies and concluding that limitations
imposed on federal agency authority by Privacy Act often conflict with actual federal agency
practice).
139. One commentator aptly articulated the conflict:
To rely upon agencies to police the [Privacy] Act is, at best, to invite problems.
Agency interest in efficiency, budgetary restrictions, and need for information could
all too often conflict with the individual's desires and rights under this statute. Agen-
cies cannot reasonably be expected to promote zealously that which is felt to be in
conflict with their own interests.
An Overview, supra note 11, at 327.
140. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1988); see supra note 61 (providing statu-
tory language of routine use exemption).
141. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988); seesupra notes 121-24 and accompa-
nying text (discussing purpose behind adoption of routine use exemption).
142. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4) (1988); see supra note 71 (providing statu-
tory language of routine use notice requirement). Notice is also provided through the statu-
torily required "Privacy Act Statement" which informs individuals for whom information is
978
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This notice requirement was intended to facilitate the exercise of
individual rights under the Privacy Act, while deterring the secret
infringement of individual privacy by federal agencies. 143
Federal agencies, however, have used the notice requirement to
bypass the nondisclosure provision through the publication of
broadly worded routine use notices. 144 Federal agencies engaged in
this practice treat the Privacy Act as a procedural notice statute,
rather than a safeguard against government invasion of individual
privacy.1 45 After reviewing two years of federal agency performance
collected of the purpose for which the information will be used and the consequences of not
providing the information. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3) (1988).
143. See supra notes 106, 115 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent and
compromise when adopting notice requirements).
The notice requirement, however, is of questionable value to the average individual who is
unlikely to have access to the Federal Register. See The President's Annual Report on the Agencies'
Implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974 CY 1982-1983 118 (Dec. 4, 1985), cited in OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC USES AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 17, 19 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT] (noting problem with value of notice requirement is
limited access of general public to Federal Register in which notice is provided). Moreover, it is
doubtful whether the average individual can read, let alone comprehend, the notices appear-
ing in the Federal Register. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 506-
10 (discussing limited effectiveness of federal agency notice to general public). Alternatively,
the individual may seek out the annual compilation of Privacy Act notices. Once located,
however, the individual faces the arduous task of attempting to find the relevant notice provi-
sion in a multi-volume compilation spanning more than 3,700 pages. See Office of the Federal
Register, Privacy Act Issuances, 1987 Compilation V (1987) (composing 5 volumes and 3,732
pages of "descriptions of systems of records maintained on individuals by federal agencies
which were published in the Federal Register" and "rules of each agency which set out the
procedures that agencies will follow in helping individuals who request information about
their records").
144. See H.R. REP. No. 927, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1990) (noting that "some agencies
apply automatically all general routine uses to all systems of records" without adequate con-
sideration for whether "some or all [of the] general routine uses are not compatible with the
purpose of each system of records"); Berman & Goldman, supra note 7, at 17 (noting that
concern of federal agencies is over compliance with notice requirements rather than compati-
bility of disclosure with purpose for collection).
145. See H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note 144, at 67. The report states that:
Agencies proceed on the apparent belief that any disclosure can be authorized as
long as a routine use has been established in accordance with the Privacy Act's proce-
dures. This is a distortion of the law. There must be a connection between the pur-
pose of the disclosure and the purpose for which the information was collected. In
absence of a sufficient nexus between these two purposes, an agency cannot create
routine uses simply because a disclosure would be convenient or to avoid the proce-
dural requirements established in subsection (b) [nondisclosure provision] of the Pri-
vacy Act.
Id.
Representative Glenn English expressed the sentiment of many critics of federal agency
complacence:
One of my chief concerns is that the bureaucracy, with the approval of OMB, has
drained much of the substance out of the [Privacy] Act. As a result, the Privacy Act
tends to be viewed as strictly a procedural statute. For example, agencies feel free to
disclose personal information to anyone as long as the proper notices have been
published in the Federal Register. No one seems to consider whether the Privacy Act
prohibits a particular use of information.
Hearings on Oversight of Privacy Act, supra note 91, at 5 (opening statement of Rep. English).
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under the Privacy Act, the Study Commission concluded that the
routine use exemption had been applied "loosely and exclusively
from the agency's point of view."
146
Federal agencies continue to circumvent the nondisclosure provi-
sion through broadly worded routine use notices. 147 In order to ad-
vance institutional interests and to achieve increased operational
efficiency, federal agencies have abused the routine use exemption.
The following examples illustrate the nature and extent of the
abuse.
To ensure the efficient and accurate distribution of limited bene-
fits and services, many federal agencies have developed enforce-
ment branches to assist in the verification of eligible recipients and
the detection of fraud and waste. 148 In furtherance of this goal,
these federal agencies have adopted broadly worded routine uses to
facilitate inter-agency exchange of enforcement and investigative in-
formation. 49 These federal agencies, however, have not considered
whether the purpose of exchange is "compatible" with the purpose
of collection and is thereby consistent with the statutory language of
the routine use exemption.15
0
Law enforcement agencies have also employed the routine use ex-
emption to avoid the restrictive language of an applicable disclosure
exemption.' 5' In 1975, Attorney General Edward H. Levi requested
all federal agencies to establish a routine use for the transfer to law
enforcement agencies of records indicating potential violations of
the law.' 52 The United States Department ofJustice (DOJ) also re-
quested federal agencies to authorize as a routine use the transfer of
personal information to DOJ for use in employment and security
146. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 519; see Hearings on Over-
sight of Privacy Act, supra note 91, at 51 (stating that notice requirement was "designed to
require that the agencies examine the data, see if the use that the other agency was going to
put it to was compatible with the reason for which it was collected, then issue notice so the
public and other agencies and OMB could comment on the propriety of the exchange").
147. Belair, supra note 138, at 501; see Narrowing the "Routine Use" Exemption, supra note 11,
at 133 (noting manner of federal agency application of routine use exemption is inconsistent
with purpose of Privacy Act).
148. See A Constitutional Analysis, supra note 29, at 150 (noting that driving force behind
federal agency expansion of enforcement and investigative mechanisms is accurate and
proper distribution of federal entitlements).
149. See id. (finding widespread abuse of routine use exemption to facilitate "free flow" of
enforcement and investigative information).
150. Id.; see supra note 61 (providing definition of routine use); supra notes 134-35 and
accompanying text (examining compatibility requirement of routine use exemption).
151. See Narrowing the "Routine Use" Exemption, supra note 11, at 133-34 (examining efforts
by Department ofJustice to circumvent statutory restrictions of Privacy Act through routine
use exemption).
152. Id. at 133; Belair, supra note 138, at 501.
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investigations. 153 DOJ officials continued the practice, even after
they recognized that the proposed uses for the collected informa-
tion did not conform with the statutory definition of routine use.
5 4
The single greatest abuse of the routine use exemption, however,
came from its application to computer matching. 5 5 Computer
matching involves the comparison of separate federal agency record
systems in an effort to detect fraud, waste, or abuse in government
programs. 156 Although commendable, computer matching con-
flicted with the purpose of the routine use exemption and the goal
of the Privacy Act to safeguard individual privacy.
157
In 1977, the Carter Administration instituted "Project Match,"
the first computer matching program designed by the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare to identify federal government
employees who were fraudulently receiving welfare payments.
158
Proponents of the program justified it under the routine use exemp-
tion, arguing that the detection of fraud or waste in government
programs furthered the protection of legitimate government inter-
ests and, therefore, was compatible with the purpose of computer
matching. 159 Carl F. Goodman, General Counsel for the United
153. Narrowing the "Routine Use"Exemption, supra note 11, at 133; Belair, supra note 138, at
501.
154. Narrowing the "Routine Use" Exemption, supra note 11, at 134; Belair, supra note 138, at
501.
155. See Hearings on Oversight of Privacy Act, supra note 91, at 276-79 (statement of John
Shattuck, American Civil Liberties Union) (noting misuse of routine use exemption to evade
nondisclosure provision for computer matching). See generally Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection Act of 1986: Hearings on S. 2756 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Manage-
ment of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (examining impact
of computer matching on Privacy Act); Oversight of Computer Matching to Detect Fraud and Mis-
management in Government Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Man-
agement of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter
Oversight of Computer Matching to Detect Fraud] (surveying and reviewing computer matching
programs by federal agencies).
156. Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Idntification Systems, Computer Matching, and
Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 992 (1974). Similar problems have arisen
from the use of "front-end verification." Berman & Goldman, supra note 7, at 18-20. Front-
end verification is a form of computer matching which permits computer verification of infor-
mation at the time an individual applies for benefits. Id. Although more restricted in scope
than computer matching, front-end verification places the same privacy interests at risk. Id.
157. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (examining compatibility requirement
of routine use exemption); infra notes 243, 259-62 and accompanying text (reviewing judicial
enforcement of compatibility test for routine use exemptions).
158. See STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 98Tn CONG., 1ST SESS.,
WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY? OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 BY THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND BY THE CONGRESS 10 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter WHO
CARES ABOUT PRIVACY?] (discussing Project Match); Shattuck, supra note 156, at 1003 (review-
ing initial reluctance and ultimate acceptance of computer matching programs such as Project
Match).
159. Berman & Goldman, supra note 7, at 15-16. The proponent's position was reflected
in the routine use notices published in the Federal Register. Id. at 14. For example, one notice
of a proposed match between records maintained by the Office of Personnel Management and
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States Civil Service Commission, and other critics of the program
rejected the proponents' compatibility argument as tenuous and op-
posed the program as violative not only of the routine use exemp-
tion, but also of the Privacy Act's protection of individual
liberties. 160 The proponents of computer matching eventually pre-
vailed, and initial reluctance gave way to widespread acceptance of
the position that computer matching was justified under the routine
use exemption. 16 1 The pervasiveness of computer matching was
staggering. 162 In a 1986 study, the Office of Technology Assess-
ment reported that in 1984, eleven cabinet-level departments and
four independent federal agencies conducted 110 separate com-
puter matching programs, consisting of 700 total matches and in-
volving seven billion records.' 63 Such abuse of the routine use
exemption continued for eleven years before Congress took action.
In 1988, Congress enacted the Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection Act (Computer Matching Act) which precludes treatment
of computer matching as a routine use. 1' Although the Computer
Matching Act eliminated one widespread abuse of the routine use
exemption, it had no effect upon other questionable applications of
the exemption.' 6 5 Moreover, federal agency treatment of computer
matching as a routine use is symptomatic of a greater problem-a
the Veterans' Administration proposed the following routine use: "An integral part of the
reason these records are maintained is to protect the legitimate interests of the government,
and therefore, such a disclosure is compatible with the purposes for maintaining these
records." Id. at 14 n.43. See generally Kirchner, Privacy: .4 History of Computer Matching in the
Federal Government, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 14, 1981, "In Depth" at I (providing comprehen-
sive historical examination of bureaucratic battle over computer matching when first insti-
tuted and effect of OMB practices on matching practices).
160. Letter from Carl F. Goodman, General Counsel, Civil Service Commission, to
Charles Ruff, Deputy Inspector General, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (July
27, 1977), reprinted in Oversight of Computer Matching to Detect Fraud, supra note 155, at 122-25;
Berman & Goldman, supra note 7, at 15 n.46.
161. Shattuck, supra note 156, at 1003.
162. See Oversight of Computer Matching to Detect Fraud, supra note 155, at 1-76 (noting that
files of welfare and medicaid recipients, draft-aged taxpayers, veterans, federal employees,
persons entitled to supplemental security income, and others were involved in computer
matches).
163. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 52.
164. The Computer Matching and Privacy Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat.
2507-2514 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(o)-(r) (1988)); see infra notes 209-11 and
accompanying text (discussing enactment of Computer Matching Act and Privacy Act).
165. Examples of violations of the routine use exemption include the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's routine disclosure of derogatory information to other agencies and the
Civil Service Commission's transmission of information on an individual's character, reputa-
tion, and personal characteristics to other agencies. FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at xliv. These and similar abuses were not affected by the
Computer Matching Act. Id.; see id at xliv-xlv (concluding that Internal Revenue Service and
Selective Service System profess confidentiality yet allow routine use disclosures to other
agencies).
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problem not addressed by the Computer Matching Act.16 6 Left un-
checked, the institutional interests of federal agencies will continue
to eclipse individual privacy interests. 167 As long as federal agency
compliance with the Privacy Act rests on self-enforcement, individ-




The Privacy Act assigns OMB chief responsibility for formulating
guidelines on federal agency implementation of and for overseeing
federal agency compliance with the Privacy Act.169 In 1975, OMB
issued comprehensive guidelines implementing and interpreting the
Privacy Act,'70 which it later supplemented.' 7' Since 1975, OMB
has sporadically issued guidelines on issues affecting the Privacy
Act, 172 but has yet to provide significant guidance on the application
of the routine use exemption.
73
166. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text (examining internal agency conflict
between administrative efficiency and protection of individual privacy interests).
167. See WHO CAREs ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 36 (finding that "[p]rivacy inter-
ests frequently conflict with other important governmental interests such as economy and
efficiency. As a result, there is a constant risk that privacy concerns will not be fully or fairly
considered by federal agencies"); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 6
(noting change in executive branch focus from privacy-related concerns to interest in effi-
ciency, management, and budget).
168. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMErr, supra note 143, at 17 (noting from review of
studies on Privacy Act that major weakness of Privacy Act is its reliance upon individual fed-
eral agency initiative).
169. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(v) (1988); see supra note 112 (providing statutory
language of OMB responsibilities).
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (Paperwork Act) further requires OMB to monitor
federal agency compliance with the Privacy Act. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1988)). For a discussion of the effect of the Paperwork
Act on OMB responsibilities see WHO CAREs ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 18-20 (find-
ing no basis for claim that Paperwork Act enlarged scope of OMB oversight role).
170. OMB Guidelines, supra note 124, at 28,948-78.
171. Office of Management and Budget, Supplementary Guidance, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741-
43 (1975), reprinted in SOURCE BooR ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 1131-33.
172. See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, Revised Supplemental Guidance on Im-
plementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,338 (1984) (presenting OMB guide-
lines on relationship between Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act); Office of
Management and Budget, Privacy Act of 1974; Guidelines on the Relationship of the Debt
Collection Act of 1982 to the Privacy Act of 1974, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,556 (1983) (presenting
OMB guidelines on effect of Debt Collection Act of 1982); Office of Management and Budget,
Privacy Act of 1974; Supplemental Guidance for Matching Programs, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,138
(1979) (presenting OMB guidelines on computer-matching programs), revised, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, Privacy Act of 1974; Revised Supplemental Guidance for Conducting
Matching Programs, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,656 (1982).
173. H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note 144, at 67. The report notes that
[p]art of the problem of routine use abuse is the result of a failure of OMB to issue
sufficiently detailed guidance on interpreting the routine use provision of the law.
OMB has also failed to publish model routine uses that prescribe the terms and con-
ditions for disclosures that agencies throughout government must use.
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After reviewing OMB's guidelines, the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations concluded that OMB had failed to fulfill its re-
sponsibility under the Privacy Act to provide guidance to the federal
agencies. 174 OMB guidelines also fail to reflect changes in case law
or federal agency experience under the Privacy Act. 17 - In addition,
OMB guidance has occasionally sanctioned federal agency practices
which, arguably, were inconsistent with the Privacy Act.' 7 6
In 1975, for example, in contravention of the language and spirit
of the Privacy Act, OMB advised federal agencies to consider disclo-
sure of records to congressional staff a routine use. 177 Another ex-
ample involved OMB guidance on computer matching. In 1979,
OMB promulgated the first guidelines on computer matching, 178
174. WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 2. The conclusion of the House
Committee is widely shared. See id. at 8-9 (reviewing complaints of witnesses that OMB aban-
doned its responsibilities under Privacy Act).
175. See 2J. O'REILLY, supra note 89, ch. 21.06, at 21-23 (noting OMB reluctance to con-
form with case law); WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 35 (finding OMB gui-
dance not "reflective of experience with the law, problems encountered by agencies, or court
decisions").
176. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 17 (noting after review of
Privacy Act studies that OMB guidelines contradict purpose of Privacy Act).
177. Office of Management and Budget, Implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, Sup-
plementary Guidance, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741 (1975). OMB recommended that federal agencies
adopt a routine use for all record systems to permit disclosure "to a congressional office from
the record of an individual in response to an inquiry from the congressional office made at the
request of that individual." Id. at 56,742. The proposed routine use would "obviate the need
for the written consent of the individual in every case where an individual requests assistance
of the member which would entail a disclosure of information pertaining to the individual."
Id. Moreover, OMB advocated that:
[i]n those cases where congressional inquiry indicates that the request is being made
on behalf of a person other than the individual whose record is to be disclosed, the
agency should advise the congressional office that the written consent of the subject
of the record is required. The agency should not contact the subject unless the con-
gressional office requests it to do so.
Id. Although expedient, the proposed routine use effectively provided that federal agencies
should abandon their oversight and enforcement responsibilities under the Privacy Act.
The guidelines were OMB's response to congressional pressure and complaints about the
refusal of federal agencies to release records in response to congressional staff inquiries. Nar-
rowing the "Routine Use" Exemption, supra note 11, at 134. The federal agencies properly re-
jected the staff inquiries as outside the scope of the congressional disclosure exemption,
which is limited to requests from either house of Congress or its committees. Id.; see Privacy
Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(9) (1988).
178. Office of Management and Budget, Privacy Act of 1974; Supplemental Guidance for
Matching Programs, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,138 (1979). The revised guidelines were proposed "to
aid agencies in balancing the government's need to maintain the integrity of Federal pro-
grams with the individual's right to personal privacy." Id. at 23,139. The most significant
requirement imposed by the guidelines was the need for a cost-benefit analysis. Id. Addi-
tional reporting and operating requirements were established. Id. at 23,139-42. Computer
matching continued after the promulgation of the guidelines, although at a reduced pace.
Kirchner, supra note 159, "In Depth" at 15-16. For a discussion of computer matching pro-
grams and their implementation by federal agencies, see supra notes 155-63 and accompany-
ing text (discussing use of routine use exemption to facilitate computer matching programs).
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which it revised in 1982179 to eliminate virtually every safeguard es-
tablished in its earlier guidelines. 80 Predictably, the revised guide-
lines encouraged, rather than discouraged, federal agency misuse of
the routine use exemption.' 8'
In addition to promulgating guidelines, OMB is responsible for
oversight of federal agency compliance with the Privacy Act.'8 2 In
this capacity, OMB has been severely criticized for failing to meet its
obligations under the Privacy Act.'8 3 Critics claim that OMB has
"virtually abdicated responsibility" for overseeing federal agency
compliance. 8 4 In particular, OMB has failed to exercise effective
oversight of the routine uses employed by federal agencies.' 8 5 Con-
179. Office of Management and Budget, Privacy Act of 1974; Revised Supplemental Gui-
dance for Conducting Matching Programs, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,656 (1982).
180. See WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 11-13 (comparing requirements
under 1979 and 1982 guidelines). The guidelines eliminated the cost-benefit analysis require-
ment and relaxed the notice and reporting requirements. Id. at 10-12.
181. See id. (reviewing OMB guidelines on computer matching and concluding that they
resulted in increased use of computer matching); id, at 35 (recognizing influential role of
Inspectors General who operated numerous matching programs behind revised guidelines);
see also supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text (discussing misuse of routine use exemption
to allow computer matching).
182. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(v) (1988); see supra note 169 (reviewing ex-
panded oversight responsibility of OMB under Paperwork Act); see also WHO CARES ABOUT
PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 17-24 (describing scope of OMB oversight role).
183. See Berman & Goldman, supra note 7, at 17 (concluding that "neither OMB nor any
of the other agencies ... have played an aggressive role in making sure that agencies ... are
equipped to comply with the [Privacy] Act and are, in fact, doing so") (quoting PRIVACY PRO-
TECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 2 1); WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note
158, at 21, 38 (finding OMB oversight based solely on submitted record systems reports
which do not include information on "limitations in disclosure; accounting requirements; ac-
cess and correction procedures; notice requirements; information collection and maintenance
limitations; and the requirement for safeguarding of information").
184. Hearings on Oversight of Privacy Act, supra note 91, at 259 (statement ofJohn Shattuck,
American Civil Liberties Union). For similar views, see id. at 201 (statement of Professor
David H. Flaherty) (stating that "OMB has never done any effective monitoring of the imple-
mentation and impact of the Privacy Act"); id. at 46 (statement of James Davidson) (stating
"today it [(the Privacy Act)] is probably lying there relatively dormant with very little enforce-
ment or at least only occasional enforcement"); id. at 240 (statement of Ronald Plesser, Coun-
sel to Commission) (stating that "OMB has done relatively little in conjunction with its
statutory requirements to provide guidance and assistance to oversight of the implementation
of the provisions of the Privacy Act").
185. Currently, OMB employs approximately 50 desk officers to oversee federal agency
compliance with the Privacy Act. Telephone interview with OMB Staff Specialist (Oct. 3,
1990) [hereinafter Telephone Interview]. Each desk officer is assigned to one or more federal
agencies and is responsible for reviewing agency reports on new or altered systems and pro-
posed Federal Register notices submitted pursuant to the Privacy Act. Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(r) (1988); see Office of Management and Budget, Management of Federal Infor-
mation Resources, Circular No. A-130, Appendix I, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,730, 52,739-41 (1985)
[hereinafter OMB Circular No. A-130] (outlining contents and procedural requirements of
reports). These reports include information concerning how proposed routine uses satisfy
the compatibility requirement of the Privacy Act. Id. at 52,740.
Neither the Privacy Act nor OMB require an independent review of routine uses employed
by federal agencies. Telephone Interview, supra. OMB oversight, therefore, is limited to those
routine uses reported by the federal agencies. Id. Once a record system has been approved,
however, there is a presumption that any proposed routine use is compatible and proper
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sequently, objectionable federal agency practices have gone un-
checked.18 6 OMB's performance to date evinces its inability to
provide adequate oversight and guidance to the federal agencies.
V. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Absent a constitutionally protected right to privacy in personal
information, responsibility for safeguarding personal privacy fell
upon Congress.' 8 7 Recognizing this duty, the House Committee on
Government Operations voiced its intention to "exercise a vigorous
oversight check on agencies" in order to ensure strict compliance
with the routine use exemption. 88 The Senate also recognized the
need for aggressive oversight of the Privacy Act.' 8 9
The principal congressional oversight mechanism in the Privacy
Act is the requirement that every federal agency report to Congress
under the Privacy Act. Id. Consequently, any routine use proposed subsequent to OMB ap-
proval can escape review. Id.
Any problems with the submitted reports or proposed notices are brought to the attention
of the federal agency by the assigned desk officer. Id. Although the Privacy Act does not
empower OMB with enforcement authority, the federal agencies are generally very responsive
and willing to effectuate requested changes. Id. Unfortunately, because of a regular turnover
in federal agency personnel charged with the enforcement of Privacy Act provisions, many of
the errors and mistakes of predecessors are repeated. Id.
186. See H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note 144, at 67, 68 (noting that "It]here is no evidence
OMB has increased its oversight of routine uses since 1982" and that "OMB has not at-
tempted any systematic review of new routine uses"); WHO CAREs ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note
158, at 22 (finding that OMB failed to apply its oversight authority to temper agency utiliza-
tion of routine use exemption).
187. 120 CONG. REC. 40,410 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (noting that while courts
recognize government's potential to invade individual privacy, responsibility to protect
against such invasion lies with Congress), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8,
at 869.
188. H.R. REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 12, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
note 8, at 305. One commentator observed the need for congressional oversight to protect
against abuse of the routine use exemption:
The routine use provision carries with it the potential for serious abuse. Congres-
sional oversight is presently the major check against wholesale agency publication
designed to establish routine uses which cover situations where, in keeping with the
spirit and the letter of the [Privacy] Act, disclosure would require the consent of the
individual concerned. Individual actions against agencies provide a partial solution
to this potential problem, but the overwhelming volume of material recently pub-
lished by agencies suggests that the availability of such actions may not be sufficient
to deter agency abuse.
An Overview, supra note 11, at 314.
189. 120 CONG. REC. 40,409 (1974) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (recognizing need for "ag-
gressive" oversight by Senate Committee on Government Operations), reprtited in SOURCE
BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 867. But see S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 24 (recogniz-
ing limited congressional resources to keep track of every federal agency and data bank as
required for "consistently constructive policy analysis"), r47inted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY,
supra note 8, at 177. Clearly, the Senate's proposal for the establishment of a Privacy Com-
mission with broad investigative and enforcement powers indicated a recognition of the po-
tential limits and constraints of congressional oversight. See supra note 107 and accompanying
text (examining authority of Privacy Commission).
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on any proposal to establish or to amend a system of records. 190
Although not explicitly required by the statutory language of the
reporting requirements in the Privacy Act, routine uses are included
in the reports submitted by federal agencies. 19' The reports are di-
rected to the House Committee on Government Operations and the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs' 92 and are intended to
allow Congress to evaluate the potential impact of a proposed sys-
tem of records on individual privacy rights.
193
Through its oversight of federal agency reports, Congress has
been able to prevent some abuses of the routine use exemption. 94
The scope of congressional oversight, however, is limited by the
content of the reports.' 95 The reports provide information on pro-
posed routine uses, but do not include information on their actual
implementation.' 96 Consequently, Congress is often unable to eval-
190. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(r) (1988); see OMB Circular No. A-130, supra
note 185, at 52,739-41 (presenting federal agency guidelines on contents and requirements
of reports); see also WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 24-27 (reviewing reports
submitted to Congress and finding them of limited usefulness). In addition to these federal
agency reports, biennially Congress receives a report from the President that includes identifi-
cation of changes to or additions in record systems. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(s)
(1988); see OMB Circular No. A-130, supra note 185, at 52,739 (outlining information federal
agencies should be prepared to supply OMB for biennial reports). Finally, notice of all pro-
posed routine uses must appear in the Federal Register. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(e)(4)(D), (e)(11) (1988).
191. See OMB Circular No. A-130, supra note 185, at 52,740 (requiring federal agencies to
provide information on why proposed routine uses comply with compatibility requirements);
see also infra note 213 (examining proposed congressional initiative to explicitly require inclu-
sion of routine uses in federal agency reports). In addition, the federal agencies must attach a
copy of any proposed notices of routine uses that are to appear in the Federal Register. Id.
192. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(r) (1988). Although both the House and Senate
receive reports, only the former has shown any interest in exercising its oversight responsibili-
ties. Telephone Interview, supra note 185; see also H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note 144, at 68 (stat-
ing that "[r]outine uses have been regularly reviewed by this Committee [House Committee
on Government Operations] whenever a notice has been received").
193. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(r) (1988). Earlier language expanded upon the
purpose to include "an evaluation of the probable or potential effect" on "the disclosure of
information relating to such individuals." Id. § 552a(r) (Amendments). The change in statu-
tory language resulted from amendments to the Privacy Act in 1988. Computer Matching and
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503, § 3(b), 102 Stat. 2507-2514 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(r) (1988)).
194. Several federal agencies heeded congressional objection to their proposed informa-
tion uses. See, e.g., WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 41 (responding to congres-
sional objection of routine use as vague and overly broad, United States Postal Service
modified routine use language); id. at 41 (reacting to congressional questioning of necessity of
routine uses proposed by Federal Emergency Management Agency and resulting in their de-
letion); id. at 42 (objecting to automatic application of 11 general routine uses to new system
of records by National Bureau of Standards and finding disclosures incompatible with narrow
purpose of system of records); id. at 43 (finding Department of Transportation notice incon-
sistent with proposed routine uses and causing appropriate amendment of notice); id. at 50-51
(finding Department of Labor routine use too broad to indicate nature of disclosures and
requiring amendment of notice).
195. See id. at 38-39 (noting limitations on congressional oversight); supra note 183 and
accompanying text (discussing limitations of reporting requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(r)).
196. WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 38-39.
987
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:957
uate whether actual disclosures are compatible with the proposed
routine uses. 197 More importantly, while Congress may recommend
modifications to proposed routine uses, it is powerless to enforce its
suggestions. 198
For instance, in 1981, the United States Department of State pro-
posed a routine use as part of a newly established system of records
that would allow disclosures to other domestic or foreign govern-
ment bodies "having interest" in the records.' 99 Congress objected
to the "interest" language in the proposed routine use as impermis-
sibly vague.200 The Department of State responded with an expla-
nation of its position, but refused to amend the routine use
notice.201
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was even less receptive to
congressional oversight. 20 2 In 1982, the CIA proposed a routine
use for all of its systems of records to allow disclosure whenever
"necessary or appropriate to enable the Central Intelligence Agency
to carry out its responsibilities under any federal statute. ' 203 Con-
gress objected to the proposed routine use because it identified
neither the purpose for disclosure nor the class of recipients.2 04
Congress asserted that because virtually any disclosure could be
covered under the broad language, the proposed routine use was
clearly contrary to the purpose and intent of the routine use exemp-
tion.205 William Casey, the Director of the CIA, rejected Congress'
recommendations, stating that a more narrow routine use would be
unworkable because it "would not be very helpful" to provide a de-
tailed listing of every possible routine use.20 6 Congress responded
that a comprehensive listing was, in fact, exactly what the Privacy
Act required. 207 The CIA chose to disregard Congress' suggestions
and implemented the routine use as proposed. 208
197. Id. at 38.
198. Based on information provided in the reports, the Government Information, Justice
and Agriculture Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations makes
written or telephone inquiries to federal agencies recommending changes to proposed rou-
tine uses or notices or other actions inconsistent with the Privacy Act. See id.
199. Id. at 43.
200. Id. at 44. Routine uses must be "compatible" with the purpose for which the infor-
mation was collected. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) (1988).
201. WHO CARES ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 44.
202. See id. at 46 (reviewing CIA confrontation with Congress over proposed routine use).
203. Id. (quoting Central Intelligence Agency, Privacy Act of 1974; Proposed Amendment
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While these examples suggest that Congress is powerless to en-
force its recommendations on proposed routine uses, it can take leg-
islative action to remedy perceived defects in the Privacy Act.
Exercising that power, Congress finally took action in 1988 to rectify
a long standing abuse of the routine use exemption. 20 9 The Com-
puter Matching Act ended years of misuse of the routine use exemp-
tion as a justification for computer matching.2 10 Instead of
prohibiting computer matching, however, the Computer Matching
Act merely establishes independent procedural safeguards to pro-
tect individual privacy.211
The Computer Matching Act has been the only significant amend-
ment to the Privacy Act.21 2 Congress has repeatedly declined to act
upon proposed recommendations for legislative reform, including
suggested revisions of the routine use exemption. 21 3 Congress has
209. Congress has expressly authorized the very kind of computer matching programs
which prompted enactment of the Computer Matching Act. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)); Social Security Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1510 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 441
(1988)); Food Stamp Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 96-58, 93 Stat. 389-392 (1979)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (1988)); Food Stamp Act Amendments of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-249, 94 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (1988)); Food Stamp and
Commodity Distribution Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1282 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 612c note (1988)); Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5312 (1988)); Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)).
210. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503,
102 Stat. 2507-2514 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(o)-(r) (1988)). Under the Computer Match-
ing Act, computer matching is no longer considered a "routine use" of federal agency
records. Id.; see supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text (discussing earlier abuse of routine
use exemption to facilitate computer matching).
211. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(o)-(r) (1988). The Computer Matching Act
requires federal agencies to enter into a written agreement specifying the purpose for the
match, the records to be matched, and a cost-benefit analysis for the match. Id. § 552a(o).
Notice requirements provide that an individual subject to a match must be informed of the
proposed match. Id. § 552a(o)(1)(D). The Computer Matching Act prohibits federal agencies
from taking adverse action against an individual as the result of a match without first indepen-
dently verifying the basis for the action. Id. § 552a(p). An individual also has the right to a
hearing before any adverse action is taken depriving the individual of any benefits. Id.
212. See EhIke, supra note 1, at 835-40 (examining three minor amendments to Privacy
Act).
213. In The President's Annual Report on the Agencies' Implementation of the Privacy
Act of 1974 for 1982 and 1983, Congress was encouraged to consider problems of interpreta-
tion and implementation of routine uses by federal agencies and to give clearer guidance on
routine use disclosures. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 143, at 18-19.
As part of its final report, the Study Commission recommended several legislative reforms,
including a revised routine use test. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 111,
at 519. Congress has not acted upon any of these proposals. See Ehlke, supra note 1, at 840
(recognizing failure of Congress to take action on Study Commission recommendations).
Recently, H.R. 3695 was introduced in the second session of the 101st Congress to make
changes in federal agency requirements applying to the collection of information. H.R. 3695,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H 11,895 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990) [hereinafter 3695].
After H.R. 3695 passed the House, it was conveyed to the Senate Committee on Governmen-
tal Affairs where it died in committee. 120 CONG. REC. H 11,903 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990)
Significantly, H.R. 3695 proposed to amend the Privacy Act's reporting requirements to
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even been reluctant to hold oversight hearings on the Privacy Act,
and, in fact, waited nine years before convening the first oversight
hearings in 1983.214 Because no legislative proposals were forth-
coming, the hearings focused almost exclusively upon OMB gui-
dance and oversight efforts.2 1
5
A. Recommendations for Improved Compliance and Oversight
Current oversight and enforcement efforts have been unsuccess-
ful in preventing widespread abuse of the Privacy Act. Federal
agencies have been unwilling to police themselves. 216 Similarly, the
efforts of Congress and OMB to provide guidance and to ensure
compliance have met with limited success. 217 Seventeen years after
the passage of the Privacy Act, neither Congress, OMB nor the fed-
eral agencies appear to be any more capable of effective oversight or
enforcement. Ultimately, it is the flawed statutory enforcement and
oversight scheme that is responsible for the failings of the Privacy
Act.
If federal agency compliance is to improve, responsibility for gui-
dance, oversight, and enforcement of the Privacy Act should be
vested in an independent agency.2 18 A "Privacy Board," modeled
after the Senate's proposed Privacy Commission, should provide
much-needed oversight and guidance.2 19 In order to neutralize the
inherent conflict between the information-gathering interests of fed-
eral agencies and the privacy-protection interests of private individ-
uals, the Privacy Board should be authorized to promulgate binding
facilitate increased OMB and congressional oversight. H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note 144, at
64-68. Section 204(a)(1) required the Director of OMB to conduct a review of federal agency
routine uses with an emphasis on uniformity and consistency with applicable laws and pub-
lished guidelines. H.R. 3695, supra § 204(a)(1), 136 CONG. REC. H 11,901. Results of the
review were to be reported to Congress. Id § 204(a)(2).
Section 204(b)(2) amended subsection (r) of the Privacy Act to require federal agencies to
report on the establishment of proposed routine uses or significant changes to existing rou-
tine uses. Id § 204(b)(2). The provision was included "because the existing requirement has
not been uniformly interpreted to include the advance reporting of new and changed routine
uses." H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note 144, at 66.
214. See Hearings on Oversight of Privacy Act, supra note 91, at 1.
215. Id. at 22-24.
216. See supra notes 136-68 and accompanying text (discussing failure of federal agencies
to enforce compliance); H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note 144, at 67-68 (finding federal agency
abuse of routine use provision of Privacy Act).
217. See supra notes 136-215 and accompanying text (reviewing limited success of OMB
and Congress to prevent abuse and ensure compliance); see also H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note
144, at 67 (recognizing OMB's failure to prevent abuse of routine use by federal agencies).
218. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 37 (recommending
establishment of Federal Privacy Board empowered to enforce Privacy Act); Hearings on Over-
sight of Privacy Act, supra note 91, at 6 (statement of Rep. English) (voicing support for estab-
lishment of permanent, independent enforcement agency).
219. See supra note 107 (examining powers and responsibilities of Senate proposed Privacy
Commission).
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guidelines to coordinate federal agency compliance with the Privacy
Act.220 In addition, Congress should grant the Privacy Board inves-
tigatory powers so that it might conduct inspections to oversee and
to ensure compliance with the Privacy Act.22 1 Finally, the Privacy
Board must be empowered to enforce the Privacy Act.222 Other-
wise, Congress' experience with the CIA and the Department of
State will be repeated and recommendations will go unheeded.
223
Commentators have long favored the establishment of an in-
dependent enforcement agency.224 Unlike Congress and OMB, an
independent Privacy Board is less likely to forsake individual privacy
interests in favor of government interests in efficiency or informa-
tion collection. 225 As an independent authority, the Privacy Board
will be more likely to succeed where Congress and OMB failed and
to bring federal agencies into compliance with the Privacy Act.
VI. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
A. Statutory and Procedural Barriers
The role of federal courts under the Privacy Act is limited.
226
Federal court jurisdiction is restricted to four categories of viola-
tions: federal agency refusal to amend or to grant access to records,
and federal agency failure to maintain records accurately or to com-
ply with any other provision of the Privacy Act.227 This last category
encompasses wrongful disclosure of personal information by a fed-
eral agency in violation of the routine use exemption.
228
220. See, e.g., An Overview, supra note 11, at 327 (recognizing inevitable conflict between
agency interests and privacy protection mechanisms imposed by Privacy Act); PRIVACY PRO-
TECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 518 (noting that conflict between agency infor-
mation needs and limitations of Privacy Act presents great risk of improper disclosure); supra
notes 138-41 (discussing conflict between federal agencies and Privacy Act).
221. See S. 3418, supra note 90, § 105(a), 120 CONG. REC. 36,918, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK
ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 342-43 (providing Privacy Commission with broad investigatory
powers).
222. See S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 23-27, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY,
supra note 8, at 176-80 (noting need for enforcement authority to ensure compliance).
223. See supra notes 199-208 and accompanying text (examining federal agency refusal to
comply with congressional suggestions).
224. S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 23, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra
note 8, at 176; see also WHo CARES ABOUT PRIVACY?, supra note 158, at 36 (finding lack of
Privacy Act oversight and need for increased representation of privacy interest, and recom-
mending that Congress "consider alternatives to OMB as a privacy oversight agency").
225. See supra notes 138-41, 169-208 and accompanying text (finding conflict of interest in
execution of Privacy Act in OMB and Congress).
226. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1988) (defining agency actions for which
civil remedies are available).
227. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(A)-(g)(1)(D); see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (stating
basis ofjurisdiction and available judicial remedy).
228. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (1988); see supra note 61 (providing
statutory language of routine use exemption) and notes 121-35 and accompanying text (re-
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Claimants face formidable statutory and procedural barriers
before a suit may be brought for wrongful disclosure in violation of
the routine use exemption. 229 Only the injured individual has
standing to sue2" 0 the federal agency responsible for the wrongful
disclosure.2" 1 The individual bears the burden of proof23 2 and has
two years from the date of the wrongful disclosure to bring suit.
2
33
The wrongful disclosure must be of personal information from a
record23 4 contained in a system of records. 2 5 In addition, the dis-
viewing legislative history of routine use exemption). See generally 2J. O'REILLY, supra note 89,
ch. 20.08 (examining scope and application of routine use exemption).
229. It should be noted, however, that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a pre-
condition to bringing a damages suit for wrongful disclosure. See, e.g., Diederich v. Depart-
ment of Army, 878 F.2d 646, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding damages suit under Privacy Act
not barred by exhaustion doctrine); Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (distin-
guishing section 552a(g)(1)(A) amending claims requiring exhaustion of remedies from sec-
tion 552a(g)(4) damage claims not requiring exhaustion) (citing Nagel v. Department of
HEW, 725 F.2d 1438, 1441 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); Hewitt v. Grabicki, 794 F.2d 1373, 1379
(9th Cir. 1986) (finding exhaustion of remedies not precondition for damages suit under Pri-
vacy Act).
230. Because injury and damages under the Privacy Act are individual, standing is limited
to the person subject to adverse action. See 1 G. TRUBOW, PRIVACY LAW & PRAcancE 2-113 to -
114 (1989) (recognizing associations denied right to represent member interests and unsuita-
bility of class actions under Privacy Act); Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677, 684-85 (10th Cir. 1980)
(holding section 552a(g)(1) only provides for civil action brought by individual); see also id.
(denying union standing to sue on behalf of adversely affected federal employees); Dresser
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1237-38 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing corporation
standing to sue on employees' behalf), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980). But see Parks, 618
F.2d at 684-85 (recognizing possibility of association standing); Hunt v. Washington State
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (holding associations have standing when
members would otherwise have standing, interest is germane to association's purpose, and
neither claims nor relief require participation of individual members of suit).
231. See, e.g., Connelly v. Comptroller of the Currency, 876 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir.
1989) (holding no cause of action against individuals for violations of Privacy Act); Brown-Bey
v. United States, 720 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating Privacy Act claims properly dis-
missed when prison inmate sued individuals rather than agency); Wren v. Harris, 675 F.2d
1144, 1148 n.8 (10th Cir. 1982) (noting that Privacy Act authorizes civil action only against
agency); see also Saint Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th
Cir. 198 1) (finding no cause of action against state agencies under Privacy Act); Irwin Memo-
rial Blood Bank of the San Francisco Medical Soc'y v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 640 F.2d
1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding no action lies against independent entity).
232. SeeJohnston v. Home, 875 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Edison v. Depart-
ment of Army, 672 F.2d 840,842 (11 th Cir. 1982) in support of requirement that complaining
party bears burden of proving violation).
233. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5) (1988). Where the "agency has materially
and willfully misrepresented any information required under this section to be disclosed to an
individual and the information so misrepresented is material to establishment of the liability
of the agency to the individual," the two year statute of limitations is extended to "any time
within two years after discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation." Id.; see Diliberti v.
United States, 817 F.2d 1259, 1262-64 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding failure to file action within
statute of limitations deprived federal court of subject matter jurisdiction).
234. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (1988); see supra note 41 (providing defini-
tion of record).
In keeping with its legislative origins, the definition of record has been broadly interpreted:
The definition of. . . "Record" . . . has been expanded to assure the intent that a
record can include as little as one descriptive item about an individual and that such
records may incorporate but not be limited to information about an individual's edu-
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cation, financial transactions, medical history, criminal or employment records, and
that they may contain his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identify-
ing marks, particularly assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print, or a
photograph.
Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,883, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRI-
VACY, supra note 8, at 993. See generally 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 89, ch. 20.06 (examining
scope of record definition).
Courts generally have adhered to an expansive definition of "record." See, e.g., Chapman v.
NASA (Chapman I), 682 F.2d 526, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding private notes taken by
federal agency employer of meetings with employee reflecting employee job performance
later incorporated into personnel file constituted records under Privacy Act), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1038 (1984). OMB Guidelines, however, distinguish between federal agency records and
records privately maintained by agency employees over which the agency exercises no con-
trol; the latter records fall outside the scope of the Privacy Act. OMB Guidelines, supra note
124, at 28,952, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 1028. Courts consider-
ing the distinction have held that private records are not subject to the restrictions of the
Privacy Act. See Bowyer v. Department of Air Force, 804 F.2d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1986) (find-
ing supervisor's private notes not subject to Privacy Act requirements unless used by federal
agency in decisions concerning employee status) (citing Boyd v. Secretary of Navy, 709 F.2d
684, 686 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984)); Chapman 1, 682 F.2d at 529
(recognizing private notes used to refresh memory but not involved in decision making pro-
cess as outside scope of Privacy Act).
235. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (1988); see supra note 43 (providing defini-
tion of "system of records"). See generally 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 89, ch. 20.07 (examining
nature and scope of system of records definition).
A system of records consists of records under federal agency control that are retrievable by
reference to a personal identifier. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (1988); see OMB
Guidelines, supra note 124, at 28,952, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at
1027 (examining requirements of systems of records). In contrast to the broad interpretation
given to records, courts have narrowly interpreted system of records. See Savarese v. Depart-
ment of HEW, 479 F. Supp. 304, 307-09 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (granting summary judgment when
disclosed information was located in system of records, but not retrieved from system of
records at time of disclosure), afd mein. sub nom. Savarese v. Harris, 620 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); Smiertka v. Department of Treasury, 447 F. Supp.
221, 228-29 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding daily investigative reports prepared as summaries of work
not within scope of Privacy Act), remanded on other grounds, 604 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
The requirement that the records be under federal agency control is designed to establish
accountability and to distinguish agency records from private records. OMB Guidelines, supra
note 124, at 28,952, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 1027. The "re-
trieved by" language in the definition of system of records acknowledges that records may
exist containing personal information which do not fall within a system of records because
they are not retrievable by a personal identifier. Id. at 28,952, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 1028.
Only records actually retrievable by a personal identifier, not those potentially retrievable,
are protected by the Privacy Act. Id. This distinction has led one commentator to write:
"[t]hus, the method used to retrieve a record rather than its substantive content determines
its coverage under the Privacy Act." Ehlke, supra note 1, at 831. Moreover, federal agencies
are under no affirmative duty to place records within a system of records. See, e.g., Manuel v.
Veterans Admin. Hosp., 857 F.2d 1112, 1119 (6th Cir. 1988) (declining to adopt contention
that Privacy Act places duty on agency to place records in system of records), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1055 (1989); Wren v. Heckler, 744 F.2d 86, 89 (10th Cir. 1984) (refusing to recognize
duty of agency to place information in system of records); Savarese, 479 F. Supp. at 306 (find-
ing that agency is not required to place information into records upon request nor to remove
records upon request).
The possibility for abuse of the system of records language was aptly recognized by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit:
[T]he Privacy Act, in its current state, permits the situation whereby an employee
may be deprived of his or her rights when an agency, or its custodian of records,
purposely or with malice misdirects or prevents information from getting into the
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closure must be willful or intentional, 23 6 and cause237 the individual
system of records. This Court [recognizes] ... that there are gaps in the Privacy
Act.... The potential for abuse obviously does exist.
Manuel, 857 F.2d at 1120. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit declined to take action, concluding
that it was "the responsibility of Congress to fill in these gaps within the Privacy Act and
clarify those areas and situations in which records must be placed within the agency's system
of records." Id. The Study Commission also criticized the system of records language, find-
ing it frustrated the purpose of the Privacy Act by permitting personal information to be held
by agencies which was inaccessible to the individual. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMIS-
SION, supra note I ll, at 503-04. The Study Commission concluded that
the system-of-records definition has two limitations. First, it undermines the [Pri-
vacy] Act's objective of allowing an individual to have access to the records an agency
maintains about him, and second, by serving as the activating, or "on/off switch" for
the [Privacy] Act's other provisions, it unnecessarily limits the [Privacy] Act's scope.
To solve this problem without placing an unreasonable burden on the agencies, the
Commission believes the [Privacy] Act's definition of a systems of records should be abandoned
and its definition of a record amended.
Id. (emphasis in original).
236. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1988).
The "willful or intentional" standard of proof was the product of a compromise reached
between competing Senate and House versions. See supra note 113 (examining compromise
standards of proof). "On a continuum between negligence and the very high standard of
willful, arbitrary, or capricious conduct, ... [the willful or intentional standard is to be viewed]
as only somewhat greater than gross negligence." Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note
39, at 40,882, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 990. Applying the inten-
tional or willful burden of proof, courts have split on the standard's requirements. Some
courts have required more than gross negligence. See, e.g.,Johnston v. Horne, 875 F.2d 1415,
1422 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring more than gross negligence, but declining to define gross
negligence); Andrews v. Veterans Admin. of the United States, 838 F.2d 418, 425 (10th Cir.)
(requiring conduct exhibiting more than gross negligence, and at minimum, reckless behav-
ior), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988); Moskiewicz v. Department of Agric., 791 F.2d 561, 564
(7th Cir. 1986) (requiring conduct of "reckless behavior and/or knowing violations of the
[Privacy] Act" for meeting greater than gross negligence). Other courts have found gross
negligence sufficient. See Chapman v. National Aeronautics & Space Admin. (Chapman II),
736 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (likening gross negligence to willfilness), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1038 (1984); Albright v. United States (Albright II), 732 F.2d 181, 189 n.25 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (noting liability for violations caused by gross negligence). Still other alternative
definitions of willful or intentional have been advanced. See, e.g., Laningham v. Department of
Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (defining intentional or willful as conduct "so
patently egregious and unlawful 'that anyone undertaking the conduct should have known it
unlawful' ") (quoting Wisdom v. Department of Housing & Urban Dev., 713 F.2d 422, 425
(8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984)); Chapman I, 736 F.2d at 243 (requiring
evidence of "unlawful intent" or "ulterior motive"); Albright II, 732 F.2d at 189 (defining
willful or intentional as "committing the act without grounds for believing it to be lawful, or
by flagrantly disregarding others' rights under the [Privacy] Act").
Failure to meet the intentional or willful standard results in a complete bar to suit under the
Privacy Act. The willful or intentional requirement has prevented numerous individuals from
seeking redress for injuries suffered as a result of federal agency violations of the Privacy Act.
See, e.g., Andrews, 838 F.2d at 424 (stating no remedy for Privacy Act violation absent showing
of willful or intentional agency action); Wisdom, 713 F.2d at 424 (finding no liability where
federal agency disclosure of inaccurate records was pursuant to its unchallenged regulations);
Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding no "willful or deliberate" violation
of Privacy Act where federal agency response to request for records was confused and
delayed).
237. A causal connection between the adverse effect and alleged violation must be estab-
lished. See Albright v. United States (Albright II), 732 F.2d 181, 186-88 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(upholding lower court finding of no evidence of causal connection between violation and
adverse effect in section 552a(g)(1)(D) claim); Edison v. Department of Army, 672 F.2d 840,
845-46 (11th Cir. 1982) (interpreting section 552a(g)(4) to require showing that allegedly
erroneous records were proximate cause of adverse determinations); see also Bruce v. United
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to suffer an adverse effect.238 If successful, the court may award ac-
tual damages, court costs, and attorney fees.239 Failure to surmount
any one of these obstacles, however, is adequate grounds for
States, 621 F.2d 914, 917 n.9 (8th Cir. 1980) (questioning in dicta whether causation could be
proved).
238. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (1988).
The "adverse effect" language was adopted from the House bill. H.R. 16,373, supra note
90, § 552a(g)(1)(C), 120 CONG. REC. 36,654, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note
8, at 287. The Senate bill used similar language, granting standing to any "aggrieved per-
son." S. 3418, supra note 90, § 303(b), (c), 120 CONG. REC. 36,921, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK
ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 371. The Senate language was designed to "afford the widest
possible standing." S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 83, reprinted in SOURCE BooK ON PRI-
VACY, supra note 8, at 236.
Courts have generally interpreted the adverse effect requirement broadly, in keeping with
the language of the Senate bill. See Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677, 682-83 (10th Cir. 1980) (inter-
preting adverse effect standing requirement broadly based on legislative history of Senate
bill); see also Project, supra note 15, at 1328-29 (finding conflicting congressional intent, but
recommending broad interpretation to fulfill purpose of civil remedies provision). Neverthe-
less, claims are frequently dismissed for failure to establish an adverse effect. See Hewitt v.
Grabicki, 794 F.2d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissing damages suit for absence of adverse
action); Harper v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 192, 196-97 (D.S.C. 1976) (failing to find ad-
verse effect as result of disclosed information). But see Albright v. United States (Albright II),
732 F.2d 181, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (recognizing that emotional trauma alone is sufficient
adverse effect, provided adequate showing of causation); Parks, 618 F.2d at 683 (finding
mental distress and embarrassment actionable adverse effect).
239. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A), (B) (1988). See generally Note, Damages
Under the Privacy Act of 1974: Compensation and Deterrence, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 619-22
(1984) (examining remedial provisions of Privacy Act).
The award of court costs and attorney fees is mandatory in a successful damages suit, but
otherwise discretionary. See Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,882, reprinted
in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 990. In a successful suit for damages, the Privacy
Act provides that recoverable actual damages shall not be less than $1000. Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) (1988). Absent statutory or legislative guidance, the courts
have split on the extent of actual damages recoverable for wrongful disclosure. Compare Fitz-
patrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 331 (11th Cir. 1982) (restricting actual damages to pecuniary
damages, denying recovery for mental injuries, loss of reputation, and embarrassment) and
Albright v. United States (Albright I), 558 F. Supp. 260, 264 (D.D.C. 1982) (limiting actual
damages to out-of-pocket expenses), aftd, 732 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1984) with Parks v. IRS,
618 F.2d 677, 680 (10th Cir. 1980) (seeking recovery for psychological injuries) andJohnson
v. Department of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971, 983-86 (5th Cir. 1983) (defining actual damages to
include damages for physical and mental injury where supported by competent evidence); see
also 1 G. TRUBOW, supra note 230, at 2-118 to -120 (examining split in courts over scope of
actual damages).
Courts have interpreted the remedial provisions of the Privacy Act as exclusive, and have
been unwilling to extend injunctive relief for wrongful disclosure. See, e.g., Doe v. Stephens,
851 F.2d 1457, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (denying requested injunctive relief for return of medi-
cal records, exclusion of information from grand jury, and ban on disclosure by United States
Attorney and staff); Hastings v.Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1104
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (refusing declaratory and injunctive relief as contrary to statutory language),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986); Parks, 618 F.2d at 684 (finding improper implying broad right
to injunctive relief). But see Florida Medical Ass'n v. Department of HEW, 479 F. Supp. 1291,
1299 n.8 (M.D. Fla.) (permitting injunctive relief against agency disclosure of personal
records on ground that section 552a(g)(1)(D) confers general grant ofjurisdiction to issue
injunctive and declaratory relief), vacated and remanded, 601 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1979). At least
one court has attempted to rectify the inadequacy of relief for wrongful disclosure by recog-
nizing an implied private cause of action arising out of constitutional violations. See Doe v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 483 F. Supp. 539, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding private
cause of action warranted because Privacy Act afforded incomplete relief). Available remedial
relief severely limits the ability of injured parties to be made whole and restricts relief to after-
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dismissal.240
B. Notice Test and Compatibility Test
Only if the plaintiff overcomes these statutory and procedural bar-
riers will the court reach the issue of wrongful disclosure. When
determining whether disclosure of personal information is proper
under the routine use exemption, courts consider the routine use
notice published in the Federal Register, as well as the purposes for
which the information was collected and disclosed. 24 1 Courts have
generally relied upon two tests, the notice test and the compatibility
test, when determining whether disclosure is proper under the rou-
tine use exemption. The notice test focuses on whether the disclo-
sure falls within the explicit language of the routine use notice
published in the Federal Register.24 2 The compatibility test examines
whether the disclosure is "compatible" with the purpose for which
the information was collected.
243
the-fact recovery of damages. See Haase v. Sessions, 893 F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (ex-
plaining that Privacy Act provides for injunctive relief in only two specific situations).
240. See, e.g., Diliberti v. United States, 817 F.2d 1259, 1262 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding fail-
ure to file suit within two years deprives federal court of subject matterjurisdiction); Hewitt v.
Grabicki, 794 F.2d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissing damages suit for lack of adverse
action); Hanley v. Department ofJustice, 623 F.2d 1138, 1139 (6th Cir. 1980) (barring action
under Privacy Act when records not within system of records); Mervin v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 591 F.2d 821, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming judgment against plaintiff for failure
to prove agency did not amend records in response to request).
241. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) (1988); see supra note 61 (providing statu-
tory definition of routine use); supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text (discussing legisla-
tive history of routine use exemption).
242. For applications of the notice test, see Swenson v. United States Postal Serv., 890
F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1989) (narrowly interpreting routine use for disclosure to congres-
sional office in response to congressional inquiry made at request ofindividual as inapplicable
when individual did not request information); Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Department
of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (relying on amicus brief's interpretation of
relevant language in routine use to find disclosure not pursuant to routine use), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 864 (1990); Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 86-87 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding routine
use for referral of records to law enforcement officials only when records themselves indicate
violation of law and routine use published after disclosure); Doe v. Naval Air Station, 768 F.2d
1229, 1231-32 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding disclosure of vehicle registration information to law
enforcement agencies not covered by administrative routine uses); Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677,
681-82 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding no routine use in disclosure of information about not partici-
pating in savings bond program or soliciting such sales when such use not established
through notice and comment rulemaking).
243. For applications of the compatibility test, see Swenson v. United States Postal Serv.,
890 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1989) (adopting Brit test and finding disclosure in response to
congressional inquiry concerning alleged undercounting of rural mail routes incompatible
with purpose for collection, which was performance of routine personnel functions) (citing
Britt v. Naval Investigative Serv., 886 F.2d 544, 549-50 (3d Cir. 1989)); Doe v. Stephens, 851
F.2d 1457, 1466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding agency cannot simply promulgate routine uses
to avoid non-consensual disclosure provision of Privacy Act); Andrews v. Veteran's Admin. of
the United States, 613 F. Supp. 1404, 1413 (D. Wyo. 1985) (holding that enacted agency
regulations must be consistent with purposes of Privacy Act and that inconsistent regulations
are invalid and cannot justify release of covered information), re 'd, 838 F.2d 418 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit applied the notice test in Tijerina v. Walters.244 Tijerina, a
Texas bar applicant, brought suit against the Administrator of Vet-
erans' Affairs for making an unsolicited disclosure of personal infor-
mation to the Texas Board of Law Examiners (Board).245 During a
random audit of Veterans' Administration Home Loan Guaranty ap-
plications conducted by the Veterans' Administration (VA), a dis-
crepancy was discovered in Tijerina's file which was referred to the
VA's Office of Inspector General (OIG).246 In the course of its in-
vestigation, OIG learned that Tijerina intended to take the Texas
bar examination. 247 Some time after OIG declined to prosecute
Tijerina, a Deputy Inspector General wrote an unsolicited letter to
the Board, informing the Board that OIG had investigated Tijerina
and concluded that he had falsified a document in connection with
his VA loan.24
8
The VA argued that the disclosure was protected by two routine
uses published in the Federal Register.249 Interpreting the routine
uses narrowly, the court rejected the VA's argument, and held that
neither routine use justified the disclosure.250 The court found that
OIG's disclosure based on suspicions of possible violations did not
qualify under the routine use allowing disclosure where "a sus-
pected violation or reasonably imminent violation of law" was antic-
ipated.251 Similarly, the court held that the routine use requiring
disclosure in response to a request for information was inapplicable,
because the Board had not "requested" the information. 252
In Britt v. Naval Investigative Service,253 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit modified the notice test by requiring
that the routine use published in the Federal Register provide ade-
quate notice of the nature and purpose of the disclosure.254 Britt
involved the unsolicited disclosure of a Naval Investigative Service
244. 821 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1987).




249. Id. at 793. One routine use permitted "disclosure of information relevant to a sus-
pected violation or reasonably imminent violation of law to another agency charged with in-
vestigating the violation," while the other permitted "the VA to respond to an official request
of a state agency by disclosing information relevant to that agency's decision whether to issue
a license to an individual." Id.
250. Id. at 798.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. 886 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1989).
254. Britt v. Naval Investigative Serv., 886 F.2d 544, 548 (3d Cir. 1989) (observing that
Congress intended Federal Register to provide meaningful public notice of purpose of releasing
information).
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(NIS) report to Britt's employer, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service.2 55 The court examined the routine use published in
the Federal Register and found it to be overly broad.256 The court
concluded that Britt received inadequate notice of the disclosure
and its purpose.25 7 Rather than decide the case on these grounds,
however, the court turned to the issue of compatibility.258
Applying the compatibility test, the Third Circuit rejected NIS's
argument that disclosure need merely relate to the routine use pub-
lished in the Federal Register.259 Drawing on the legislative history of
the Privacy Act, the court required a dual inquiry into the purpose
of collecting the personal information and the purpose of disclo-
sure.260 Applying the compatibility test to the facts, the court held
that the disclosure was incompatible with the purpose for which the
information was collected. 26' The court explained that "[t]here
must be a more concrete relationship or similarity, some meaningful
degree of convergence, between the disclosing agency's purpose in
gathering the information and its purpose in disclosing the
information." 262
In Covert v. Harrington,263 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit recognized the interrelationship between the stat-
utory definition of routine use,26 the routine use exemption, 265 the
255. Id. at 546.
256. The notice published in the Federal Register read:
ROUTINE USES OF RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE SYSTEM, INCLUDING
CATEGORIES OF USERS AND THE PURPOSES OF SUCH USES:
To other investigative units (federal, state or local) from whom the investigation
was conducted, or who are engaged in criminal investigative and intelligence activi-
ties; federal regulatory agencies with investigative units.
Id. at 547 (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 22,802-03 (1985)).
257. Id. at 548. The court recognized that the notice was adequate for disclosures to
"other investigative units," but that the notice for "federal regulatory agencies with investiga-
tive units" gave no statement of purpose for which the information could be released. Id. at
547-48.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 549.
260. Id. The court's analysis is in keeping with the Study Commission's recommendation
that "the compatible-purpose test of the routine use exemption should be augmented by a
test for consistency with the conditions or reasonable expectations of uses and disclosure
under which the information was provided, collected or obtained." PRIVACY PROTECnON
STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 519.
261. Britt v. Naval Investigative Serv., 886 F.2d 544, 550 (3d Cir. 1989).
262. Id. at 549-50.
263. 876 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1989).
264. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) (1988); see supra note 61 (providing statu-
tory language of routine use definition).
265. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1988); see supra note 61 (providing statu-
tory language of routine use exemption); supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing legislative history of routine use exemption).
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routine use notice published in the Federal Register,266 and the rou-
tine use notice267 provided at the time of information collection. 268
Employees of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation brought suit, claim-
ing that unlawful disclosure of their personnel security files by the
Department of Energy (DOE) to the DOE Inspector General and
the United States Department of Justice resulted in their criminal
prosecution. 269 The court declined to apply a compatibility test.270
Instead, the court held the disclosure unlawful on the grounds that
it was contrary to the routine use notice provided to the employees
on the form used to collect the disclosed information.271 The court
explained that this notice, like the notice appearing in the Federal
Register, was an integral part of the statutory scheme of the Privacy
Act and could not be ignored.272 Both notice requirements were
designed to let individuals know why and for what purpose personal
information was requested of them.273
Judicial enforcement of the notice and compatibility tests has suc-
cessfully prevented some abuses of the routine use exemption by
federal agencies. Moreover, both tests advance objectives of the
Privacy Act. Both tests enable individuals to determine what per-
sonal information is collected and disclosed by federal agencies and
to ensure that the purpose for which personal information is used is
consistent with the purpose for which it is collected. 274 By inter-
preting routine use notices narrowly, courts encourage federal
agencies to provide complete and accurate notification of the pur-
poses for which collected information will be used.275 The compati-
266. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D) (1988); see supra note 71 (providing
statutory language of notice requirement).
267. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(C) (1988). Section (e)(3)(C) requires that
every agency "inform each individual whom it asks to supply information, on the form which
it uses to collect the information or on a separate form that can be retained by the individual
... the routine uses which can be made of the information, as published" in the Federal Regis-
ter. Id.
268. Covert v. Harrington, 876 F.2d 751, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that agency's
failure to inform plaintiff that information would be used for law enforcement purposes vio-
lates section 552a(e)(3)(C)).
269. Id. at 752.
270. Id. at 755.
271. Id. at 755-76.
272. Id. at 756. In reaching this statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit noted that its
decision was consistent with that of the First Circuit, which had decided a similar issue. Id.
(citing and quoting Usher v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 721 F.2d 854, 856 (1st Cir.
1983) (finding no statutory reason for agency noncompliance with notice requirement)).
273. Covert v. Harrington, 876 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1989).
274. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (Congressional Findings and State-
ment of Purpose).
275. See Analysis of Compromise Amendments, supra note 39, at 40,881 (cautioning agencies "to
think out in advance what uses it will make of information"), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 987-88.
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bility test restricts attempts by federal agencies to circumvent the
Privacy Act through the publication of broadly worded routine use
notices. Enforcing the compatibility requirement prevents federal
agencies from using information for purposes unrelated to those for
which the information was collected. Finally, decisions such as Cov-
ert and Britt encourage strict compliance with the notice require-
ments of the Privacy Act.
Unfortunately, courts are seldom able to apply these tests because
they do not reach the issue of wrongful disclosure. Statutory and
procedural barriers prevent ready access to the courts. 27 6 Indeed,
these obstacles frequently act as a complete bar to private enforce-
ment and recovery under the Privacy Act.27 7 In its final report, the
Study Commission recognized the inadequacy of civil remedies
under the Privacy Act, stating that the enormous number of record
systems, the expense and time in bringing an action, and the re-
quirement of willful or intentional behavior make enforcement by
the individual impracticable. 278 The Study Commission noted that
"[t]he circumstances in which an individual can bring suit, his possi-
ble reward for doing so, and the instances in which a court can order
an agency into compliance with the [Privacy] Act are all too limited
to provide an effective accountability mechanism. ' 279 The Study
Commission's observations are particularly troubling given the sig-
nificance both the Senate and House placed on private
enforcement. 280
C. Recommendations for Judicial Enforcement
If private enforcement is to be an effective check against federal
agency abuse, the incentives for bringing suit must be increased.
The Privacy Act should be amended to provide injunctive relief for
276. See supra notes 226-40 and accompanying text (discussing formidable barriers to suit
under Privacy Act); Ehlke, supra note 1, at 841 (concluding lack of litigation under Privacy Act
is, in part, result of "ineffective remedial scheme"); 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 89, ch. 22.04
(examining severe restrictions on access to civil remedies).
277. See 2J. O'REILLY, supra note 89, ch. 22.04, at 22-17 (noting individual surmounting
barriers has "won a rare victory").
278. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 111, at 529.
279. Id.
280. See S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 16, 82-83, (encouraging widest possible civil
enforcement and recognizing need for it given lack of alternative independent administrative
enforcement body), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 169, 235-36; H.R.
REP. No. 1416, supra note 8, at 15 (relying on "constant vigilance" of individuals supported by
"legal redress" to combat abuse by federal agencies), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY,
supra note 8, at 308. Courts have recognized the need to encourage private enforcement as
well. See Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677, 685 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding congressional purpose to
encourage "self-help enforcement" in order to realize goals of Privacy Act).
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all violations. 281 Injunctive relief would allow individuals to retrieve
personal information wrongfully disclosed and to prevent its further
dissemination. Also, recovery of actual damages should not be lim-
ited to pecuniary harm.28 2 The injury suffered by an individual
whose privacy has been invaded is personal in nature. Actual dam-
ages should reflect the personal, as well as the economic, harm
suffered.28
3
Access to the courts must be facilitated as well. The standard of
proof should be lowered in recognition of the fact that injuries suf-
fered are rarely intentional. 28 4 In addition, the distinction between
record and system of records should be replaced with a definition
less susceptible to manipulation. 2 5 Unless Congress acts to remove
these barriers or to limit their restrictive effect, the benefits ofjudi-
cial enforcement will remain unrealized.
CONCLUSION
The Privacy Act of 1974 attempts to strike a balance between the
government's need to gather and to use personal information and
the individual's need to exercise control over that information. The
balance, however, has never been achieved. Instead, the Privacy Act
has favored the government's desire for information at the expense
of individual privacy. Nowhere is this bias more evident than in the
routine use exemption.
Adopted to facilitate orderly government conduct, the routine use
exemption has been misused by federal agencies to disclose per-
sonal information without individual consent. OMB, federal
agency, and congressional oversight have failed to effectively pre-
vent abuse of the exemption. Nor have the courts, constrained by
the language of the Privacy Act, been able to provide adequate relief
281. See Project, supra note 15, at 1331 (advocating adoption of injunctive relief for all
violations).
282. See id. (arguing damages should not be limited if congressional goals are to be
achieved).
283. See supra note 118 (examining limited remedial relief for wrongful disclosure under
Privacy Act). Having reviewed the remedial provisions of the Privacy Act, the Study Commis-
sion concluded that Congress had intended to limit actual damages to recovery of "clear eco-
nomic loss," but recommended that recovery be broadened to include general damages.
PRIVACY PROTECTION. STUDY COMMISSION, supra note I 11, at 530.
284. See S. REP. No. 1183, supra note 37, at 24 (recognizing threat of invasion of personal
privacy comes from inadvertent action), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, supra note 8, at
177; see also An Overview, supra note 11, at 325 (recognizing intentional or willful standard as
greatest deterrent to suit under Privacy Act).
285. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 503-04 (finding that
distinction between record and system of records frustrates purpose of Privacy Act); A Consti-
tutional Analysis, supra note 29, at 149 (noting susceptibility of records definition to
manipulation).
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to injured individuals. Left unchecked, federal agencies, motivated
by institutional priorities, have continued to abuse the routine use
exemption.
Although an important first step, the Privacy Act has not achieved
its goal of safeguarding individual privacy. Congress recognized the
importance of the right to individual privacy in personal informa-
tion, but failed to provide adequately for its protection. Until Con-
gress addresses weaknesses in the Privacy Act such as the routine
use exemption, individual privacy will remain subject to unchecked
government intrusion.
